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Abstract 
This research seeks to inform on the relationship between tactics and attrition 
during the 1864 campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley.  Many studies have broadly 
examined these campaigns but have not focused their analysis on the relationship 
between tactics and attrition.  By doing this it allows this examination to gain a deeper 
understanding of how particular engagements were decided, and ultimately the fate of the 
Shenandoah Valley.  This research utilizes a chronological approach and relies on 
numerous primary sources from officers that provide an accurate appraisal of troop 
strengths and tactics employed.  Various sources such as letters, diaries, and 
correspondence have been used to support these findings.  Official reports have also 
proven to be quite useful as they provide thorough and comprehensive information on the 
progression of many engagements.  Memoirs and post war manuscripts also provide 
valuable insight into the role of attrition and the relationship with tactics.  This study 
demonstrates how attrition and tactics were closely related.  It exposes that tactics often 
dictated how extensive attrition would be in a given engagement.  Additionally it 
demonstrates how attrition, or the prospect of it, would dictate to the commanders what 
tactics could be used.  It is also evident that the army that best marshaled their resources 
to mitigate or accentuate numerical disparities would be most successful.  The field 
would benefit from an incorporation of this type of analysis, as it would provide a clearer 
explanation of how individual battles were decided.  This type of analysis distills the 
sometimes overly complex nuances of many works and provides a clear and concise 
appraisal of how battles were decided.   
 
  
Introduction 
Early autumn in the Shenandoah Valley was a serene period full of vibrant 
transformations in foliage and a welcome change from the oppressive heat.  The pastures 
and fields around Belle Grove Plantation presented a picturesque scene that one would 
hardly associate with a battlefield.  The rising sun beamed golden rays across the peak of 
Massanutten Mountain, which summoned an orchestra of singing birds.  Suddenly, a 
series of deep rolling booms echoed throughout the placid Shenandoah Valley.  If it were 
any other day, these resonations could have been mistaken for an early morning 
thunderstorm.  However, this day was quite the exception to the norm; the thunderous 
disturbance was the deep thud of Federal artillery as it frantically attempted to thwart a 
Confederate surprise attack.  As the battle raged, the fate of the Shenandoah would be 
determined and by the evening of October 19, 1864, the Confederate army there had been 
shattered, never again to roam the Valley.   
 This scene did not come to fruition independently, but was the culmination of a 
complex and dynamic campaign that spanned several months while covering multiple 
states.  In order to understand the profound implications of that fateful October day in the 
Shenandoah, it is essential to conduct an analysis of the events and battles leading up to 
it.  While external factors such as population size and economics tangentially factored 
into this campaign, it would be impractical to include them in this type of analysis.  
However, for the sake of this appraisal it is necessary to analyze the events that directly 
related to the campaign and what important factors contributed to its outcome.   
 As with most military related subjects, there exists a myriad of different 
approaches by which a topic of this nature can be analyzed.  The 1864 campaigns in the
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Shenandoah are no exception to this overarching trend.  Much of the existing research on 
the subject examines topics such as how the campaigns related in a larger context to the 
war itself or provide an evaluation of key personalities.  This research, however, intends 
to address two critical factors that influenced the outcome of numerous battles during the 
1864 campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley.  This examination will focus primarily on the 
relationship between battlefield tactics and numerical disparities as a result of attrition, 
and how these two variables altered the outcome of numerous clashes during the period.  
Traditionally the term attrition has been used in a broad sense to describe the gradual 
reduction in usable resources for combat and the support of an army.  These could 
include a broad number of variables such as lack of food, clothing, ammunition, 
casualties, or a general loss of support for the war effort.  This research, however, utilizes 
a much narrower definition of attrition.  This analysis defines attrition as occasions when 
troops are forced away from combat roles for the following reasons.  Firstly, the most 
prevalent cause of attrition was injuries and deaths sustained during battle and ancillary 
operations.  However, men being detailed to care for wounded or being deterred from 
actively participating in actual fighting and maneuvering for any other reason is also 
recognized as attrition in this analysis.  This narrower definition of attrition is adopted for 
the purposes of this analysis because it allows for an isolation of the actual battles 
themselves rather than including an array of other variables such as morale and national 
will which would be beyond the scope of this research and deserve their own individual 
treatments.  This examination does acknowledge the importance of economic shortfalls in 
the Confederate war effort and how they tangentially affected the outcomes of 
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engagements, but it is not the primary emphasis of this analysis.  Much of the existing 
literature on the 1864 Shenandoah Valley Campaign only occasionally addresses the 
relationship between attrition and tactics.  Many of the works primarily examine the 
campaign on a broader scale, but fail to focus their analysis on this specific range of 
parameters.  To this end, the following research seeks to fill a gap in the field and provide 
a fresh analysis on these influential events.  
 This research employs a chronological approach, which is helpful in charting the 
progression of tactics and attrition in various campaigns.  It will perform an examination 
of the relationship between attrition and tactics on major battles in all three campaigns in 
order to analyze developing trends and similarities.  In order to perform this appraisal the 
following research will utilize resources that provide insight into tactics and decisions 
relating to the outcomes of battles.  Official reports, diaries, and memoirs of high level 
officers are all useful in gaining accurate information about attrition levels and various 
tactical maneuvers.1   
                                                 
1
 For a broad overview of the American Civil War reference Louis P. Masur, The Civil War: A Concise 
History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).  To gain a better understanding of the political arena 
during and prior to the conflict look at Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in 
the Civil War South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).  For an analysis on what led to eventual 
Confederate defeat examine Gary Gallagher, The Confederate War: How Popular Will, Nationalism, and 
Military Strategy Could Not Stave Off Defeat (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997). Gallagher’s 
assertions in this text are recognized as an important set of arguments regarding Confederate loss.  This 
work articulates that decisions on the battlefield and mistakes in the military arena were primary 
contributors to eventual Confederate defeat.  Gallagher’s work responds to assertions in Richard Beringer, 
Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still Jr., Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1986).  Their important examination argues another common position held by 
historians in the field on Confederate capitulation.  They claim that dwindling support and lack of morale, 
not defeat in the military arena, were primary factors in Confederate defeat.  For a better understanding of 
the relationship between attrition and tactics, reference Gary W. Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley 
Campaign of 1864 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006).  For more information on 
the opening phases of the Lynchburg Campaign reference Richard R. Duncan, Lee's Endangered Left: The 
Civil War in Western Virginia, Spring of 1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998).  To 
gain a better understanding of Early’s campaign toward Washington D.C. look at Scott C. Patchan, 
Shenandoah Summer: The 1864 Valley Campaign. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007) along 
with Steven Bernstein, The Confederacy’s Last Northern Offensive (New York: McFarland, 2010).  When 
researching Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign consult Jeffry D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar 
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 Jeffery Wert’s text From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign 
of 1864 provides a well-rounded appraisal of the campaign that covers an array of 
subjects.  While this study does address attrition and, at times, its relationship to tactics it 
is not the primary focus of Wert’s analysis.  However, Wert does an excellent job of 
narrating the sequence of battles and providing valuable information on the many 
personalities involved in General Phil Sheridan’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign.  Wert’s 
broad analysis spans only the months when Sheridan was present in the Valley and leaves 
out significant segments leading up to Sheridan’s arrival.2   
Gary Gallagher’s The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 is another important 
series of arguments on the subject that cover a myriad of topics, not all of which examine 
attrition and its influence on tactics.  This study is useful in gaining an understanding of 
varying perspectives but, like Wert’s analysis, falls short in its scope.  This assemblage of 
articles narrows their evaluation primarily to Sheridan’s exploits in the Shenandoah  
Valley but provides little review on the two campaigns prior.  This research, unlike that 
of previous mentioned texts, will include the two campaigns leading up to Sheridan’s 
appearance in the Shenandoah in order to provide a more comprehensive examination of 
the topic.3   
                                                                                                                                                 
Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987).  This 
appraisal is a useful and comprehensive analysis of the campaign and provides a valuable examination of 
the campaign’s chronology.  For a comprehensive examination of the last major engagement in the 
Shenandoah consult Joseph W. A. Whitehorne, The Battle of Cedar Creek (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Library, 1992) along with Jonathan A. Noyalas, The Battle of Cedar Creek: Victory From the 
Jaws of Defeat (Charleston: The History Press, 2009).    
 
2
 Jeffry D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 3-13. 
 
3
 Gary W. Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006) x-xxi 
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  On a broader scale, this research seeks to parallel and expand upon some of the 
ideas presented in Gary Gallagher’s The Confederate War: How Popular Will, 
Nationalism, and Military Strategy Could Not Stave Off Defeat.  This text covers a 
variety of subjects but asserts that Confederate failure was not necessarily the result of a 
waning support for the war.  He also debunks some of the myths that the Confederacy 
never truly had a chance of victory due to economic and industrial weaknesses.  The crux 
of Gallagher’s assertions is that the Confederacy ultimately failed to achieve victory in 
the military theatre by simply not winning enough critical battles.  This segment of 
Gallagher’s work inspired this research to expand upon the role of tactics and attrition 
and how they facilitated the outcomes of various battles.4 
 Prior to the American Civil War, the United States had gradually divided between 
two distinctly different economies.  The South became known for its slave-based 
agricultural economy that relied heavily on the production of cash crops and exported 
goods.  The North enjoyed many fast-moving waterways, which were ideal for the 
construction of mills, but it lacked the climate to produce major cash crops.  Over time, 
the North developed an economic system that was initially anchored in agriculture but 
moved into a range of industrial endeavors.  The South’s need to maintain high levels of 
crop production spurred its inhabitants to rely progressively more on slave labor.5  By the 
late 1850s, moral and ethical qualms regarding the institution of slavery became 
increasingly popular topics in the media and the chambers of Congress.  By 1860, the 
failure of representatives from both sides resulted in the secession of South Carolina from 
                                                 
4
 Gallagher, The Confederate War, Page 3-13. 
 
5
 Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the Slave 
South (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1988), Page 17-45 
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the Union.  By April 1861, Virginia had followed the lead of neighboring states and 
joined the newly formed Confederate States of America.6 
 The South’s decision to place the Confederate capitol in Richmond had profound 
implications for the entire state and specifically, the Shenandoah Valley.  Richmond 
naturally became an important strategic target for the Union, and Federal commanders, 
along with President Abraham Lincoln, almost immediately initiated plans to capture the 
city.  Richmond’s position so close to the Union meant that it required a constant military 
presence to defend it.  The Shenandoah Valley subsequently became an ancillary target 
for the Union war effort as it represented a route into central Virginia where a Federal 
expeditionary force could disrupt Confederate internal lines that supplied Richmond.7  To 
this extent, the Shenandoah Valley was a prime corridor that could facilitate an invasion 
into central or southern Virginia.  Furthermore, this region could also be utilized by the 
Confederacy as an invasion route into the Union 
 The Shenandoah Valley possessed added value as a military target because of its 
resources and economic contributions to the Confederate war effort.  The Valley enjoyed 
the benefit of a meandering river that coursed through the region, which dramatically 
aided agricultural endeavors.  The many streams throughout the region that feed the river 
were also utilized for mills and the river itself was harnessed to transport goods to 
market.  These resources spurred the Confederacy to protect the region and subsequently 
made the Shenandoah an even greater target for the Union.  In his memoirs, Grant stated, 
“Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because it was the principal 
                                                 
6
 Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2012), Page 11-38 
 
7
 Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, Page 34-47 
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storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about Richmond. It was well known 
that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it.”8   
 By 1862, a Union army had been dispatched to capture Richmond from the south 
via the waterways adjacent to the Chesapeake Bay.  To mitigate the Federal troop 
strength around Richmond, General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson was dispatched to 
the Shenandoah Valley to create a new front of sorts that would warrant a realignment of 
Union resources to quell the new Confederate offensive.  In this sense, Jackson’s 1862 
campaign utilized the Shenandoah Valley in a diversionary capacity to alleviate pressure 
around the Confederate capitol.  During this campaign, Jackson repeatedly defeated or 
thwarted Federal attempts to crush his severely outnumbered force and succeeded in 
drawing troops away from the effort to capture Richmond.  The success of Jackson’s 
campaign made the Shenandoah Valley internationally famous and created a precedent in 
the minds of Confederate strategists that the Valley could be utilized for similar purposes 
in the future.9   
 Jackson’s campaign was not the only major Confederate military operation in the 
region that garnered the attention of the Union.  In 1863, Robert E. Lee sought to gain a 
decisive victory north of the Mason-Dixon and damper, if not extinguish, Union support 
for the war.  In order to do this, Lee needed to amass segments of his Army of Northern 
Virginia somewhere near his intended route north.  Lee recognized the Shenandoah 
Valley as an ideal staging area where he could prepare elements of his force for an 
                                                 
8
 Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant (Washington: Create Space 
Independent Publishing), 528 
 
9
 Gary Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862 (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 
2003), 4-43 
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invasion of Pennsylvania.  Here, Lee used the Valley to launch one of the most iconic 
campaigns of the war when he journeyed north and suffered a devastating defeat at 
Gettysburg.10  Lee’s northern expedition shocked the Union and was cause for concern 
amongst politicians and military strategists alike.  In an effort to prevent further 
Confederate incursions, the Union sought to eliminate the Shenandoah Valley as a viable 
staging point by which southern raids could strike targets in the Union.  In this sense, the 
Gettysburg Campaign indirectly resulted in a greater focus on the Shenandoah Valley.11   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of Gettysburg: An Atlas of the Gettysburg Campaign, June 3-July 13, 
1863 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010), 7-18 
 
11
 Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1864, Page 48, 224-225 
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Chapter 1:  The Lynchburg Campaign 
 By 1864, Ulysses S. Grant took supreme command of Union armies operating in 
Virginia and throughout the South.  Grant hoped to fix and destroy the Army of Northern 
Virginia by forcing it to defend the approaches to Richmond.  As a supporting effort, he 
dispatched Major General Franz Sigel to march south through the Shenandoah Valley and 
assault the Confederate depot at Lynchburg.12  It was Grant’s hope that the destruction of 
this railroad hub would severely inhibit or disrupt Confederate attempts to defend 
Richmond, as it would prevent the movement of men and material to the city.13   
 Franz Sigel had previously been in command of the Department of West Virginia 
and had approximately 10,000 men at his disposal at the onset of this expedition.  Upon 
hearing of Sigel’s movement, Confederate Major General John C. Breckinridge 
desperately began to marshal all available men and resources to repel Sigel’s advancing 
army.14  Breckinridge called upon John D. Imboden’s cavalry brigade to support his two 
infantry brigades commanded by Brigadier Generals Gabriel C. Wharton and John C. 
Echols.  In addition, the Confederate commander was able to muster approximately 250 
cadets from the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington to bolster his meager force.15  
Both Breckinridge and Sigel began jockeying for position as the Federals raced down the 
Valley Pike.  Breckinridge, realizing his numerical deficiencies, sought to buy himself 
                                                 
12
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter: Papers of the Military Historical Society of 
Massachusetts. Volume VI. The Shenandoah Campaigns of 1862 and 1864 and the Appomattox Campaign 
1865 (Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1907), 62-64 
13
 William C. Davis, The Battle of New Market (Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1983), 46-68 
 
14
 Edward H. Phillips, The Lower Shenandoah Valley in the Civil War (Lynchburg: H.E. Howard, 1993) 
156 
 
15
 Charles R. Knight, Valley Thunder: The Battle of New Market and the Opening of the Shenandoah Valley 
Campaign, May 1864 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2010), 23-45 
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time and directed John Imboden’s cavalry to slow and disrupt Sigel’s progression south.  
The decision to dispatch Imboden’s cavalry to stall the Federals represents a superb 
tactical decision given the Confederate numerical inadequacies.  By stalling Sigel, 
Breckinridge afforded himself enough time to muster the independent commands 
operating in the area and push his troop strength up to approximately 4,000 men.16   
 Imboden’s harassing tactics worked impeccably and forced Sigel to dispatch 
elements of his cavalry reserves to address the Confederate disruption.  In addition to 
buying Breckinridge crucial time to organize his force, Imboden’s actions sapped Sigel’s 
troop strength.17  By May 15, Imboden’s cavalry had rejoined Breckinridge’s main force 
approximately 10 miles south of the small town of New Market, which was situated 
along the Valley Pike and was surrounded by a series of rolling hills.18  Approximately a 
half-mile west of New Market is the North Fork of the Shenandoah River, which severely 
constrained the movements on the battlefield and the potential routes for a flanking 
maneuver.19  Nonetheless, Breckinridge hoped to engage Sigel’s force before they 
marched any further south and the Confederates raced down the Valley to meet the 
oncoming Federals.  
 Sigel’s army had just reached New Market when they began to make contact with 
elements of Breckinridge’s diminutive army.  By 10:00 A.M. on May 15, heavy 
skirmishing had ensued and the Confederates began to shell the Union position with 
                                                 
16
 Davis, The Battle of New Market, Page 76-84 
 
17
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66 
 
18
 Correspondence between Breckinridge and Imboden, War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Armies, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1 Correspondence (Harrisburg: The National Historical 
Society, 1971), 73 
 
19
 Murdock, E. C. “The Battle of New Market.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3 (June 1976): 668-69. 
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artillery.  The decision to postpone a full-scale frontal infantry assault and instead rely on 
artillery to weaken the enemy position represented a sound tactical decision, as it limited 
the potential for heavy losses.  Although the Union position was under direct Confederate 
artillery fire, the Federals elected to hold their line rather than assault the Confederate 
artillery.  By simply maintaining consistent artillery fire, the Confederates may also have 
hoped to draw the Federals into assaulting their position.  Although this tactic did not 
achieve the desired effect, it did represent another sound decision as it had the potential to 
force Sigel’s subordinates to assault the Confederate defensive position.20    
 By 11:00 A.M. Sigel had positioned the majority of his force in the middle of a 
series of undulating hills just west of town.  These hills have relatively low slope and 
were not confined by overly steep ravines or other topographical constraints.  To the west 
of Sigel’s line was the Shenandoah River, which prevented a Confederate flanking 
maneuver around the Federal right.  Sigel’s decision to anchor his line along the river, 
thus removing any threat of a Confederate attack from that side, was sound as it would be 
quite difficult for any sizeable Confederate force to ford the Shenandoah at this location.  
Despite the security of the Federal right, Sigel failed to secure his left flank on any 
topographical feature.  Furthermore, the Union commander did little to ensure the 
protection of his left by positioning any significant units there to prevent a flanking 
attempt.  This grave error represents an important tactical mistake as it placed the Federal 
position at serious risk.21   
                                                 
20
 Sigel’s report, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 76 
21
 Murdock, E. C. “The Battle of New Market.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3 (June 1976): 668-69. 
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 Breckinridge soon realized that the Confederate artillery bombardment had done 
little to dislodge the Federals; therefore, he devised a plan to pair a frontal assault with a 
daring flanking maneuver around the weak Federal left.22  Breckinridge ordered 
Imboden’s cavalry brigade to charge around the Federal left flank while the infantry 
brigades of Gabriel Wharton and John Echols were deployed against Sigel’s center.  
Breckinridge’s force was outnumbered but the Confederate commander hoped to disperse 
the Union troop concentration by forcing Sigel to thin his lines in order to protect his 
flank.  This helped to weaken the Federal focus on the center just in time for 
Breckinridge’s infantry assault.  This action demonstrated how Breckinridge had 
redesigned his tactics to equalize numerical disparities on the field.23       
The Confederate assault began smoothly and the Confederate infantry brigades 
were able to expel Union Colonel Augustus Moor’s troops from their forward positions 
in the middle of the field.  Moor’s troops fell back toward the main body of Sigel’s force 
around a small knoll known as Bushong’s Hill.24  Captain Carl Heintz in a panicked 
correspondence to Major General Stahel stated that Moor’s force was too weak to hold 
his position long and desperately requested reinforcements.25  However, Moor’s poorly 
positioned force did not receive reinforcements before being swept from the field.  Moor, 
in his official report, admitted that his force was severely outnumbered and only managed 
to get off one volley before being forced to retreat.26  Although the Confederates had 
                                                 
22
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66 
 
23
 Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 45-53 
 
24
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 66 
 
25
 Report of Captain C. Heintz, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 461 
26
 Report of Colonel Moor, War of the Rebellion: Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 79 
  
13
expelled the Federals from their initial position, the southern lines were beginning to 
become disoriented and in need of realignment in order to effectively continue the 
assault.  Breckinridge ordered a halt to his attack so as to re-form his units for the next 
assault on the Federal stronghold around the Bushong’s Farm.  The decision to stop the 
Confederate advance was a necessary pause as it was essential for the southern 
commanders to ensure a cohesive battle line.  In addition to the adjustment of the 
infantry, it was essential that the Confederates reposition their artillery as well.  Up to this 
point, the advancing southern brigades enjoyed the added support of artillery, which the 
smaller Confederate units desperately relied upon.  As they came closer to the Federal 
emplacement around the Bushong Farm, the gray troops began to outpace their cannons 
and they needed to move up their artillery to cover the remainder of their advance.  This 
further delayed their attack giving Sigel valuable time to organize his defense.27  
By mid afternoon, Breckinridge reinitiated his attack on Sigel, but the attack 
began to stall as his troops approached Bushong’s Hill.  The Federals were able to stave 
off the Confederate advance and disrupt the cohesiveness of the southern battle lines.28  
As the southerners attempted to take the hill, they began to suffer losses and units started 
to fall into retreat.  Federal rifle fire was inflicting casualties in the southern ranks and 
attrition was beginning to significantly reduce the already outnumbered Confederate 
forces.29  It is unclear why Breckinridge did not elect to flank around the right of the 
Federal strongpoint with his infantry.  The Confederate commander was already 
                                                 
27
 Davis, The Battle of New Market, Page 20-31 
 
28
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 67 
 
29
 Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 66-76 
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outnumbered and desperately needed to preserve as much of his fighting force as 
possible.  Given this scenario, it would have behooved the southern general to formulate 
a less dangerous assault rather than order a frontal attack over open ground.30 
With the prospect of defeat suddenly looming, the Confederate commander took 
desperate measures to strengthen his assault on Sigel’s position.  Up to this point in the 
war, the cadets from VMI had seen little action and had not been in the hottest part of the 
battle.  However, as the Confederates found themselves in an increasingly tenuous 
position, it became apparent that the young cadets would need to support the flailing 
southern line.  Although the cadets only numbered around 250, their arrival on the field 
tipped the scales in the southerners’ favor, as it gave the Confederate center the necessary 
reinforcements they needed to overcome Sigel’s position around the hill.  In his after 
action report, Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Scott Shipp Smith wrote that the cadets 
performed an essential duty by filling the gaps in the Confederate lines.  He stated that 
the Confederate frontal assault was costly and without the reinforcements may have 
failed.  Smith goes on to explain how the Confederates utilized the river to their left as a 
natural anchor point for their line.  He expressed that this prevented the prospect of a 
flanking attack, thus allowing the Confederates to press their assault with confidence.31  
Additionally, their lack of experience and general naiveté of the horrors of war also may 
have contributed to the confidence of their assault as they were not fully aware of the 
risks they were taking.  This stands as strong evidence that the successfulness of the 
Confederate assault on Bushong’s Hill directly correlates to the numerical strength of the 
                                                 
30
 Knight, Valley Thunder, Page 121 
 
31
 Report of S. Shipp, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 91 
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units involved.  Here the tactical decision to deploy the cadets combined with the 
numerical advantage of their presence resulted in the successfulness of the attack.  Union 
Major Henry Peale commented in an after action report how the Confederates “in three 
strong lines” overwhelmed the Federal position with superior numbers and great 
ferocity.32    
 
                                                 
32
 War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 
1 Correspondence (Harrisburg: The National Historical Society, 1971), 81 
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33
 
Sigel, in turn, launched a series of uncoordinated counter attacks in an attempt to 
break the southern line.  Union Colonel George D. Wells described the disorganization of 
these maneuvers in his battle report.  He stated that the Union line was plagued with 
conflicting orders and many units did not know whether to retreat or advance.  He even 
cites one instance where he grabbed a color bearer and ordered him to retreat while the 
                                                 
33
 Colonna –Morgan, Map of Battle of New Market, VMI Archives, Lexington, VA. Accessed December 8, 
2014.  http://www.vmi.edu/assets/0/430/434/811/5f7ba365-dc44-46ac-9431-d06cc47e592a.jpg 
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remainder of the regiment held their position.34  Given the evidence, it is clear that 
Sigel’s decision to counter attack diluted his force around Bushong’s Farm.  Once Sigel 
had begun to disperse his force, the Confederates were able to concentrate their efforts on 
singular, smaller elements along the Federals’ position, thus creating a series of micro 
scenarios where the southerners possessed the numerical advantage.  With the added 
pressure from the cadets and southern cavalry, Sigel’s line began to crumble into retreat.  
The southerners hurriedly pursued the withdrawing Federals as they moved north toward 
Mount Jackson.  Severely pressed, Sigel’s troops were forced to abandon their artillery as 
they rushed to extricate themselves from the field and create distance from the now 
inspired Confederates.35   
By early evening, what was left of the Federal force under Sigel retreated north of 
the Shenandoah River with enough time to burn the bridge across it and thus limit the 
southern pursuit.  Sigel’s decision to destroy the bridge bought the Federals necessary 
time to reorganize their force and prepare for another southern attack.36  However, it was 
late evening and both sides were exhausted from the day’s fighting.  Rather than pursue 
the Federals into the night, Breckinridge elected to hold his position, thus concluding any 
major action at New Market.37  Breckinridge stated in his report on the battle that the 
destruction of the bridge prevented the Confederates from easily pursuing the Federals, as 
it would have required his force to find a ford and cross the river in the night.38 
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What would become known, as the Battle of New Market is a superb example of 
the profound relationship between numerical disparities, partially caused by attrition and 
tactics.  Although Breckinridge made a few mistakes, he avoided costly blunders and was 
able to preserve his fighting force for those critical moments on the battlefield.  From the 
opening phases of the battle, the Confederate general did a superb job of deploying his 
troops where they would be the most effective.  His decision to flank around the Federal 
left with cavalry, although not entirely successful, represented a sound tactical decision.  
Furthermore, his choice to deploy the VMI cadets at that pivotal moment during the 
battle demonstrated sound tactical reasoning, which helped equalize numerical 
deficiencies caused by attrition.  Breckinridge did such a good job of employing tactics 
that would equalize numerical deficiencies that Sigel wrote after the battle, “ A severe 
battle was fought today at New Market between our forces and those of Echols and 
Imboden, under Breckinridge.  Our troops were overpowered by superior numbers.”39  
Here, Sigel admits that the Confederates utilized numbers to defeat him and how they 
played a pivotal role in the battle outcome.     
Prior to the battle, the Federals had a numerical advantage that Sigel should have 
exploited to either envelope or overwhelm Breckinridge’s inferior force.  However, Sigel 
squandered this opportunity with poor tactical decisions that placed his force in the center 
of a sweeping field with little protection.  Furthermore, Sigel failed to recognize the 
importance of protecting his flanks, and performed half hearted counter attacks, which 
did not possess the troop strength to sufficiently overwhelm the Confederate line.  It also 
stands to reason that Sigel may have placed too much faith in his position at Bushong’s 
Farm, which did not afford him the tactical supremacy he needed.  This may have led to 
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him retaining his force there for too long, which allowed the Confederates to sufficiently 
reinforce their lines and overwhelm him.40      
At the onset of the battle, the Confederates only had approximately 4,000 men at 
their disposal while Sigel’s effective fighting force numbered closer to 6,500.  By the 
evening of May 15, the Federals had moved north toward Strasburg suffering nearly 900 
casualties.  The departure of Sigel left the southern half of the Valley temporarily in 
Confederate control.  The Confederates had suffered approximately 500 casualties, which 
briefly forced Breckinridge to remain in the region while troops were detailed to care for 
the wounded.41  The Confederate victory at New Market allowed the southern army to 
retain control of the crop production in the region, along with preserving the vitally 
important rail lines in central Virginia.42      
This crucial southern victory had profound effects amongst the Union command 
structure as well.  Grant was not pleased with Sigel’s performance at New Market and 
swiftly replaced him with Major General David Hunter as commander of the Army of the 
Shenandoah.  Grant, in his memoirs, stated, “Sigel’s record is almost equally brief. He 
moved out, it is true, according to program; but just when I was hoping to hear of good 
work being done in the valley I received instead the following announcement from 
Halleck: ‘Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run; never did 
anything else.’ The enemy had intercepted him about New Market and handled him 
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roughly, leaving him short six guns.”43  The Confederates also realigned their forces 
following New Market.  Having suffered serious losses at Spotsylvania, General Lee 
ordered Breckinridge, along with the majority of his small force, to return to Lee’s Army 
of Northern Virginia.  This left the Shenandoah Valley essentially vacant with no 
significant Confederate force to confront a Union incursion.  Only Imboden’s cavalry 
brigade was left to monitor Union troop movements in the now vulnerable region.44   
Hunter quickly mobilized his force of approximately 10,000 men and began a 
march toward Harrisonburg.  During this time, Imboden resumed the tactics as practiced 
under Breckinridge and attempted to harass and slow Hunter’s movements.  Imboden, 
however, did not possess nearly enough troops to significantly impede Hunter’s advance 
for an extended period.  Even so, Imboden’s efforts did provide Lee with valuable 
intelligence and bought the Confederates in central Virginia the necessary time to 
organize a defensive plan.45   
Hard-pressed by Grant at Cold Harbor, Lee had no one besides Imboden’s meager 
force to confront Hunter’s army in the Shenandoah Valley.  In an act of desperation, Lee 
called upon Brigadier General William “Grumble” Jones to organize a defense force to 
protect the region.  Jones had previously been tasked with defending western Virginia 
along with portions of eastern Tennessee.  Jones responded to Lee’s request with 
approximately 3,800 troops, which were hastily rushed to aid Imboden’s diminutive 
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force.46  Imboden’s efforts represent excellent tactical decisions based upon the numerical 
constraints of his force.  Imboden avoided any costly battles with the larger Federal army 
and in turn preserved his force so as to buy time for Confederate reinforcements to 
arrive.47   
While Imboden awaited the arrival of Jones and his men, Hunter’s army neared 
Harrisonburg and by June 3 had arrived in the town.  Imboden did an excellent job of 
holding the Federals in place by blocking their primary avenue south via the Valley Pike.  
By doing this, Imboden successfully stalled the entire Union force by simply blocking a 
natural bottleneck in their path.  By June 4, Jones had arrived at Imboden’s position near 
Mount Crawford.  Here, the two Confederate commanders devised a plan to lure the 
Federals out from their position around Port Republic and strike them with the bulk of the 
Confederate force.  Imboden was instructed to move his contingent to Mount Meridian 
where he was instructed to draw Hunter’s force toward him but not to directly engage the 
Federals.  This was a sound tactical decision that was once again predicated on numerical 
weaknesses.  Here, Jones did a good job of directing his subordinates to avoid direct 
contact with the enemy so as to mitigate potential losses.48   
On June 6, Hunter’s force initiated their attack on Imboden’s position.  Imboden 
did as he was instructed and attempted to slow the Federal advance, but avoided any 
direct clash with the enemy.  Imboden slowly lured Hunter’s force closer to the main 
body of the Confederate army.  This tactic worked quite well; by luring the Federals 
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toward the Confederate position, it allowed the southern commander to select the place of 
battle that would be most advantageous to his force.49  For his main effort, Jones had 
selected a defensive position near Piedmont, which offered the Confederates the 
maximum tactical advantage.  Hastily constructed breastworks and the difficult terrain 
made this an adequate place to defend against Hunter’s assault.50   
Union Colonel Augustus Moor’s brigade initiated the assault on the Confederate 
strongpoint and almost immediately began to suffer heavy casualties.  Here, the 
numerically inferior southerners used the benefits of a defensive position to help equalize 
their deficiencies in manpower.51  When Moor’s brigade began to fall back, Colonel 
Joseph Thoburn rushed his brigade forward to take some of the pressure off of Moor’s 
stammering assault.  Even with Thoburn’s reinforcements in line, the Confederates were 
still able to direct sufficient artillery and rifle fire at the two Union brigades to force them 
into retreat. 52  
The Federals regrouped and reinforced Moor’s brigade and attempted a second 
assault on the Confederate position, but the southerners enjoyed the cover of breastworks, 
which drastically improved their survivability rate under enemy fire, mitigating 
casualties.  Union Colonel William G. Ely stated in his post battle report that the 
Confederate position was very well defended and that Federal efforts to expel the 
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southerners proved unfruitful for the better part of the day.53  The second attack by Moor 
began to suffer heavy casualties and was repulsed like the attacks before it.  Up to this 
point, the southerners had done a superb job of resisting a much larger force simply by 
not exposing themselves to unnecessary risks or performing casualty inducing 
maneuvers.  Jones’ performance up until this point had been excellent as he tailored his 
tactics to suit his smaller army.  The Federal Colonel Jacob M. Campbell commented on 
Jones’ defense by describing the southern trenches and stating “This appeared to be the 
key to their position, and they held it most obstinately for some time.”54  However, 
following the successful defense against two successive Federal attacks, Jones attempted 
to exploit the Union reverse and ordered a small counter assault on Moor’s retreating 
brigade.55   
Unfortunately for Jones, this counterattack did not possess the necessary troop 
strength to overcome Moor’s brigade and the southerners were quickly forced back to 
their breastworks.  This Confederate maneuver ultimately failed because Jones neglected 
to commit enough troops at once and his halfhearted attack was easily repulsed.  This 
decision represents the first major mistake made by Jones on June 5.  Realizing his error, 
Jones realigned his force and committed Brigadier General John C. Vaughn’s brigade to 
assault Moor’s beleaguered unit.  Although the addition of Vaughn’s brigade to the attack 
may have been what the Confederates needed to crush Moor, it had disastrous 
implications for the remainder of the southern battle line.56  Prior to this realignment, 
                                                 
53
 Report of William G. Ely, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 117 
 
54
 War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 37. Part 1, Page 118-129 
 
55
 Phillips, The Lower Shenandoah Valley in the Civil War, Page 56-71 
56
 Charles H. Porter, Operations of Generals Sigel and Hunter, Page 73  
  
24
Vaughn had occupied the center of the southern position.  By shifting Vaughn’s troops to 
assist in the assault on Moor, it left the Confederate center in a dangerously precarious 
situation. 57  
The Federals immediately capitalized on this mistake as Thoburn and Moor 
rushed their brigades into the gap.  Now Jones’ small force was disproportionately 
dispersed along the Confederate line and unable to effectively repel the Union spearhead.  
The two Federal brigades were able to slice the Confederate position in two and almost 
immediately the southern line began to crumble into retreat.  Colonel Ely lauded the 
effectiveness of the Union advance in his report of the battle that this final charge on the 
Confederate stronghold shattered the southern position.58  As Jones frantically attempted 
to rally his troops, he was struck by enemy fire and killed.  This loss shattered the 
Confederate command structure as it led to significant confusion among the ranks as to 
who was in command.59  Major General David Hunter articulated the effectiveness of the 
Union assault in his report stating that “Moor’s brigade rushed over the works in front, 
and a brigade of cavalry, under Colonel John Wynkoop, charged upon his right flank and 
rear. The enemy fled in confusion.”60  During the ensuing retreat, the southerners lacked 
organized and effective leadership, which led to a significant number of Confederates 
being captured. 
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Hunter used his greater numbers to exploit his success and pounced on the fleeing 
Confederates who were unable to organize a cohesive rear guard action.  The southerners 
retreated back toward Lynchburg, leaving Harrisonburg and Staunton firmly in Union 
control.  The sense of desperation following this costly Confederate defeat is indicated in 
Colonel E.G. Lee’s after action letter to Lee in which he pleaded for reinforcements.  
Colonel Lee’s statements were not unfounded, as the Confederate force had suffered 
severe casualties and, of the approximately 5,300 Confederate troops engaged at the 
battle, roughly 400 were killed or wounded.  During the disorganized retreat, the pursuing 
Federals captured another 1,000 Confederates.  What had started out as a successful day 
for the Confederates had rapidly spiraled into a disastrous defeat.61 
Hunter’s force fared much better and of the approximately 8,500 men present, 
they suffered 900 casualties.  Although Hunter’s force initially struggled to crack the 
southern position, they were eventually able to exploit weaknesses in Confederate 
command decisions.62  At the onset of the battle, Jones possessed a much smaller force, 
which he should have attempted to preserve by maintaining his defensive position at 
Piedmont.  Jones should have never put his small force at such risk by attempting to leave 
his breastworks and attack Moor’s brigade.  The southerners had been successfully 
repulsing Federal attacks with ease and there was no reason to forfeit the tactical 
advantages offered by the trenches.  Furthermore, Jones committed a grave error when he 
opened a gap in his small force by realigning Vaughn’s troops.  This fatal mistake, the 
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culmination of both numerical deficiencies and tactical errors, ultimately cost Jones the 
day, and his life.63   
Following the devastating defeat at what would become known as the Battle of 
Piedmont, Lee recognized that he needed to devote a force to operate consistently in the 
Valley to ensure the protection of his rail lines to the deep South, as they were essential to 
the survival of the capitol.  Further, the continued presence of Hunter forced Lee to act 
quickly and he dispatched Jubal Anderson Early with approximately 15,000 troops to 
defend Lynchburg.  The city had become an important hub in the supply structure that 
supported Richmond.  It had a hospital along with other supply depots that made it an 
integral component to Lee’s defensive strategy.  Rail lines that passed near the city were 
also vitally important, as they were utilized to rapidly shift troops to and from the 
Shenandoah Valley.64  With Lynchburg in peril, Imboden and Brigadier General John 
McCausland’s cavalry continued to harass and impede, if possible, Hunter’s movements 
in the Shenandoah.  During this phase of the campaign, very little transpired other than 
minor skirmishes and occasional clashes between cavalry units.  However, by June 11 
Hunter’s force had reached Lexington and in the ensuing days burned VMI in retaliation 
for their participation in the battle of New Market.65   
By June 17, Early’s force had arrived outside of Lynchburg and sought to 
confront Hunter’s force there.  Early, however, opted not to make the same mistake as 
Jones by forcing a needless and costly attack.  Instead, Early examined the terrain and 
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sought to capitalize on existing fortifications and topography.  Early elected to utilize a 
redoubt approximately 1.5 miles from Lynchburg as the anchor point for his line.  On 
either side of this fortification, he extended his trenches so as to prevent the possibility of 
a Federal flanking attack.66  Early ordered Major General John B. Gordon’s division to 
defend the left flank of the redoubt while William Lewis situated his brigade to guard the 
Confederate right.  Early’s decision to occupy this position, rather than attacking 
Hunter’s, was sound as it prevented unnecessary casualties while simultaneously 
protecting the rail lines near the city.67  Early’s arrival to Lynchburg, just before Hunter, 
gave him the opportunity to create an intricate defense that gave him a substantial 
advantage.  Grant expressed this after the war when he wrote, “To meet this movement 
under General Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his corps, a part of which reached 
Lynchburg before Hunter.” Grant went on to lament how the arrival of the Confederates 
before Hunter precluded the Federals from taking and holding the city.68   
Hunter claimed in his after action report that he was unsure of the size of the 
Confederate force and that throughout the night before, had heard the movement and 
drums of what he claimed was a sizeable enemy force.  Uncertain of the Confederate 
troop strength, he initiated a series of probing maneuvers to gauge the strength of Early’s 
force, which numbered about 14,000.69  Hunter, although possessing about 17,000 men, 
made a sound tactical decision by simply probing the southern line.  This tactic only put a 
small segment of his force at risk and did not open Hunter up to sustain heavy casualties, 
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thus preserving his numerical supremacy.  Although this tactic was sound, it would not 
have been necessary if Hunter had acted more aggressively earlier in the day as the 
Confederate force was slow to get in position.  Nonetheless, Hunter ordered Jeremiah 
Sullivan’s and George Crook’s divisions forward to test the strength of the Confederate 
center.  This action proved unfruitful as the southerners had developed a well-defended 
series of battle lines that made an assault here a costly prospect.  Meanwhile, Colonel 
Alfred Duffié was tasked with flanking around the Confederate right and exploiting any 
potential weaknesses there.70  This action availed little success for the attacking Federals 
as Confederate Brigadier John McCausland was able to repulse the Union flanking 
attempt.  Furthermore, the Confederates worked to extend their lines in order to prevent 
Federal flanking endeavors.71  Hunter wrote after the action regarding the Confederate 
positions that they were seemingly impenetrable.  He clarified his reasoning for not 
pressing the attack when he stated, “Their works consisted of strong redoubts on each of 
the main roads entering the town…flanked on either side by rifle pits.”72 
Realizing the futility of an attack on the well-defended Confederate positions, 
Hunter opted to recall his deployed units and relinquished control of Lynchburg to the 
Confederates.  The Battle of Lynchburg ultimately resulted in little more than elaborate 
troop movements with moments of heavy skirmishing.  Although no dramatic clash 
transpired, this battle is a powerful example of how the prospect of attrition dictated 
Confederate tactics, thus resulting in a strategic victory with virtually no losses.  It is also 
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evidence that Hunter was keenly aware of the impact of attrition and how strong enemy 
defensive emplacements could change the course of a battle.  Early did an excellent job 
of defending his flanks so as to prevent any attempt by the Federals to reach his rear.  
Early’s choice to remain in his defenses rather than force an attack was excellent.  By 
doing this, Early sustained no casualties while achieving the desired effect of protecting 
Lynchburg.  Overall, this low casualty battle is a powerful demonstration of how attrition 
can be controlled by tactics and in turn result in a strategic success.  Following the action 
at Lynchburg, Hunter retreated out of the Shenandoah Valley into West Virginia leaving 
the region in Confederate hands.  The lack of casualties at Lynchburg allowed Early to 
immediately begin operations in the Valley without needing to reorganize or tend to the 
wounded.  By preserving his force of 14,000 men, Early was able to throw off Union 
operations in the region and capitalize on new opportunities.73 
The battles of New Market, Piedmont, and Lynchburg all stand as excellent 
examples of the correlation between tactics and attrition.  The relationship between these 
two factors is obvious when analyzing the conditions that led to the Confederate victory 
at New Market.  The ability to consistently manage changes on the battlefield while 
mitigating risks was essential to southern success at this battle.  This relationship further 
crystallizes when examining the blunder at Piedmont.  What initially appeared as a 
Confederate victory rapidly evolved into a complete failure as the southern commander 
failed to account for the casualties he would receive by splitting his force.  Furthermore, 
the decision to divide his army was a severe tactical mistake that resulted in nearly 1,000 
men being captured.  Finally, the Confederate success at Lynchburg stands as fitting coda 
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for this phase of the campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley as it is a prime example of the 
interplay between tactics and attrition.  Here, Early avoided costly maneuvers thus 
preserving his force by either forcing Hunter to attack or retreat.  Together, these three 
battles, when juxtaposed, demonstrate a pattern that develops between battlefield tactics 
and the ever-looming risk of attrition.    
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Chapter Two: Early’s Valley Campaign 
By 1864, the Shenandoah Valley had become accustomed to the horrors of war.  
Since the early days of the conflict, both the Union and Confederacy had vied to assert 
their supremacy in the Valley.  By the summer of 1864, the war was going progressively 
worse for the Confederates and by June, Robert E. Lee’s army was encircled while 
attempting to defend Petersburg from Ulysses S. Grant’s besieging force. 
Many explanations for the outcome of various campaigns have been made and 
many emphasize an array of topics.  This research, however, will examine the 
relationship between battlefield decisions and attrition and how together they altered the 
outcome of the campaign.  For the purposes of this study, attrition will be defined as any 
time that troops are no longer capable or effective in combat roles.  Attrition, in this 
sense, is quite often referring to casualties but also general fatigue.  It can, however, refer 
to the detailing of troops to tend to wounded, or any other activity not a direct result of 
fighting.  Furthermore, attrition may refer to the elimination of usable and effective 
troops due to the chaos and disorganization of battle.  
As the Union stranglehold around Richmond tightened, the Confederate General 
Robert E. Lee devised a strategy to alleviate some of the pressure on the beleaguered city.  
He instructed General Jubal Anderson Early to clear the Shenandoah Valley of Union 
forces so as to retain Confederate control of the region and its resources.  In addition to 
regaining control of the Valley, Lee tasked Early with striking at points north of the 
Valley and possibly threatening Washington D.C. The task of sweeping the Valley of 
Union troops was not easy, but the retreat of Union General David Hunter’s army into 
West Virginia made this temporarily possible.  This left the Shenandoah clear of any 
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significant Union force to contest a Confederate advance.  The vacated Shenandoah 
Valley provided an opportunity for Early’s southerners to pursue the second part of Lee’s 
order, which was to disrupt Union operations north of the Valley and possibly threaten 
the defenses around Washington.  It was Lee’s hope that the presence of a strong 
Confederate force disrupting railroads and challenging Union supremacy in the region 
would cause concern and warrant a realignment of Union troops.74  Even Grant, in his 
memoirs, recognized the implications of leaving the Valley void of any Federal armies 
when he stated, “Meantime the valley was left open to Early’s troops, and others in that 
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this condition of 
affairs and moved on Washington.”75  It is doubtful that Lee realistically expected Early 
to occupy Washington D.C.; however, it was plausible that the defenses around the 
municipality could be seriously harassed if Early effectively marshaled his resources and 
swiftly moved down the Valley toward Northern Virginia.  If points north of the Potomac 
or Washington itself could be threatened, it might result in a dilution of the Federal army 
around Petersburg, thus alleviating pressure on the Confederate army defending the city.  
 Early made good use of the vacated Shenandoah Valley and rapidly moved north 
toward Winchester, Virginia.  The Confederates decided against remaining in the Valley 
but rather employed a more aggressive strategy.  Early opted to continue north and after 
passing through Harpers Ferry was soon situated just outside of Frederick, Maryland.  He 
had successfully moved his entire army north and had prevented it from dispersing over 
the long march.76  By advancing beyond Winchester, the southerners were operating in 
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enemy territory and needed to have all troops readily available so as to take advantage of 
time sensitive situations.  He mitigated his deficiencies in manpower by maneuvering in 
such a manner that maximized the potential of his small army.  Early’s efforts to prevent 
the dilution of his force are evidenced in various decisions from July 1-9.  On July 5, 
Early decided to bypass the Federal garrison at Harpers Ferry rather than attempting to 
take the position with his whole army and subsequently need to leave a contingent of men 
to occupy the town and defend it.77  The decision to maneuver around Harpers Ferry 
represented a sound tactical move for the Confederates.  By engaging the small Federal 
garrison defending the town, Early would have lost valuable time that would have given 
the Union forces closer to Washington the opportunity to improve their defenses.  It is 
difficult to speculate how many casualties may have been incurred by an attempt to take 
Harpers Ferry, but it is certain that it would have consumed time and resulted in potential 
losses.  Following his maneuvering around Harpers Ferry, Early quickly moved across 
the Potomac at Shepherdstown and advanced toward Frederick, Maryland.  The 
Confederates met light resistance and skirmished with Federal cavalry until finally 
arriving on the outskirts of Frederick, Maryland on July 8.  Here, Early was presented 
with an important decision that determined the nature of his operations for days to come.  
The Confederate army had the opportunity to occupy and raze the town, which certainly 
would have been a fulfillment of Lee’s order to draw Union attention away from 
Petersburg and Richmond, but rather than getting mired in a resource-consuming pseudo 
occupation, or spending the valuable time to burn the town, Early opted for a more 
expedient approach.  Early held Frederick for ransom and urged the city officials to pay 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
77
 L.W.V. Kennan, The Valley Campaign of 1865, Page 34-35 
  
34
the Confederates a sum of $200,000 to prevent him from burning the city.  The officials 
eagerly paid the ransom, which kept Early from delaying around the town longer than 
necessary.78  The ransom represented an important Confederate success, as it was a 
Union embarrassment and demonstrated to the public that the Confederates still exercised 
the ability to threaten the Northern population.  Furthermore, Early’s decision to avoid an 
occupation and keep his army moving east was tactically sound, as it kept his force 
together and allowed his army to retain a numerical advantage over smaller Union forces 
operating east of Frederick.79 
 The Union high command, aware of Early’s presence north of the Potomac, 
dispatched two infantry brigades from the Richmond and Petersburg area to address the 
new Confederate threat.  However, until these reinforcements arrived, the Federals had 
only a small force of fewer than 3,000 men that could hope to delay the advance of 
Early’s army, which consisted of approximately 14,000 troops.  Union Major General 
Lew Wallace positioned his small force at Monocacy Junction where he believed a 
bottleneck existed that the Confederates would need to pass through in order to attack 
Washington or Baltimore.80  By July 8, only a fraction of the troops dispatched from 
Petersburg had arrived to reinforce Wallace and the Federal troops were drastically 
outnumbered.  Grant recognized that Wallace’s efforts would only at best delay the 
Confederates and wrote after the war “He (Wallace) could hardly have expected to defeat 
him (Early) badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until Washington could be put 
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into a state of preparation for his reception.”81  With the addition of General James B. 
Rickett’s Division of approximately 3,500 men, Wallace’s force still had less than 7,000 
troops at its disposal.82  Early’s efforts in the days prior gave the southerners a numerical 
advantage as the Confederate general had prevented the dispersion and dilution of his 
force.  The Confederates severely outnumbered the Federals nearly two to one as the 
southerners numbered approximately 14,000.83  Early initiated a series of well-formulated 
probing maneuvers that were designed to give the Confederates a more complete 
appraisal of the size and positions of the Union army.  Early’s actions indicate that he 
was aware of the potential for a large Union force to be operating in the area as he was 
moving in northern territory.  Furthermore, Early marched among a population that was 
less likely to provide valuable intelligence of enemy positions and useful topographical 
reports.  This lack of key intelligence forced Early to maneuver more cautiously as he 
recognized how his lack of intelligence prevented overly aggressive tactics.  In addition 
to these shortcomings in intelligence and civilian support, Early was operating as an 
independent army far from any viable reinforcements.  To this end, it was imperative that 
the Confederates move cautiously.84  
 It is necessary to recognize how topography influenced Early’s decisions.  The 
Union force under Lew Wallace had positioned itself overlooking the Monocacy River so 
as to impede the advance of any Confederate attack.  The only viable bridge into 
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Monocacy Junction was also well defended as the northerners had utilized a series of 
structures and trenches to create an imposing fortification.85  If Early were to attack 
Wallace’s troops, he would need to cross the river at some point.  Rather than performing 
a frontal assault or crossing the well protected bridge, Early effectively employed a series 
of flanking maneuvers that allowed his army to cross the river approximately a half mile 
north and south of Monocacy Junction, thus keeping the Confederates out of range while 
they crossed the river.  By doing this, Early almost entirely bypassed the Union 
stronghold at the bridge.86  Here, the prospect of casualties directly impacted Early’s 
tactics and demonstrates how the Confederate commander designed his attack in a 
fashion that would preserve his small fighting force while neutralizing his opponent. 
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the Union center.88  The Confederates split their forces into three separate wings each 
responsible for pressing the attack in a different direction.  Early dispatched Major 
General Robert E. Rodes’ division to strike Wallace’s position north of Monocacy 
Junction.   Rodes’ Division outnumbered Erastus Tyler’s brigade and quickly 
overwhelmed the Federal contingent forcing them to retreat to the east.  In addition to 
Rodes’ attack, the Confederates employed Major General Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s 
division to divert Union troops to the center of Wallace’s line by feinting a frontal 
assault, which subsequently weakened the Federal’s flanks.89  Early’s memoirs indicate 
that Ramseur’s Division was to act in a diversionary capacity rather than to attempt to 
drive the Union center from the field, which according to Early would be quite costly.  
Early’s superior numbers allowed him to envelop the Union position and overwhelm 
Wallace’s much smaller force.90  It is important to recognize the tactical and 
organizational difficulties inherent to this attack.  Wallace’s defenders had positioned 
themselves in relatively static positions and initially did not need to concern themselves 
with complex maneuvers.  Early, however, was forced to manage and coordinate a 
myriad of moving parts that were all mutually dependent on one another.  The 
Confederate general needed to synchronize all of his attacks to achieve a victory that did 
not come with high southern casualties.  In this regard, Early faced a much more complex 
tactical equation than that of Wallace as he attempted to push the Federals from their 
stronghold. 
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Once across the river, the Confederate commander encountered a new series of 
challenges.  To the south of Monocacy Junction existed a series of undulating hills and 
obstacles that were just high enough to obscure the position of Wallace’s main force.  
Confederate Brigadier General John McCausland’s cavalry was the first to come across 
the 1,500 entrenched Federal troops lying in wait on the other side of the hills.91  After an 
initial assault on the Union position, Early realized McCausland’s cavalry did not posses 
the combat power to overcome the Union line.  Early utilized his numerical superiority as 
he ordered John B. Gordon’s entire division to attack the Union strong point in hopes that 
overwhelming force would quickly dispatch the enemy and limit casualties.92  In John 
Gordon’s memoirs, he recalls the rough terrain that the Union used to their advantage.  
He elaborates on the various difficulties that existed in attempting to march a battle line 
through various obstructions such as fences and ravines.  He explains these obstructions 
would immediately cause the Confederate line to become “tangled and confused.”93  
Rather than attack the Union with various piecemeal maneuvers that would most likely 
result in high losses and be repulsed, Early committed Gordon’s entire division to rapidly 
address the problem and subsequently sustained relatively few casualties.  Despite the 
rough terrain, Gordon’s division overwhelmed the Union position on the southern portion 
of the field and successfully drove them into retreat.94  Gordon reminisced on this 
moment in his memoir as he praised his troops and the enthusiasm, which resonated 
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throughout his ranks as they charged and broke the Federal position.  Gordon recalled, “I 
ordered ‘Forward!’ and forward they went. I recall no charge of the war, except that of 
the 12th of May against Hancock, in which my brave fellows seemed so swayed by an 
enthusiasm which amounted almost to a martial delirium; and the swell of the Southern 
yell rose high above the din of battle as they rushed upon the resolute Federals and hurled 
them back upon the second line.”95  
Early’s plan to out flank the Union troops on either side of Monocacy Junction 
directly resulted in fewer casualties and allowed the Confederates to take advantage of 
their numerical superiority.96  By the evening of July 9, the Union force under Wallace 
had vacated Monocacy Junction relinquishing control of the crossroads to the 
Confederates.97  The southern victory was the result of conservative, casualty mitigating 
maneuvers, as well as Early’s efforts to keep his army together and to preserve the 
numerical strength of his force in the days leading up to the battle.  Simply from a 
numerical standpoint, it is clear that the Confederates reaped the benefit of having a 
larger force that had not been whittled down by attrition from extraneous clashes in days 
leading up to the battle.  Estimates of the Monocacy engagement vary; however, most 
reports indicate that the defending Union units suffered approximately 1,300 casualties 
while the attacking Confederates suffered only 700.98   
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Following the war, Early and John Gordon became fierce opponents, as they were 
quite critical of each other’s actions during the conflict.  This contention did not prevent 
Early from applauding Gordon along with his other lieutenants in his memoirs as he 
describes the Confederate attack as “gallant” and uses dramatic phrases such as “threw 
the enemy into great confusion” and “forced him from his position.”99  Despite having to 
cross a river and attack a well-positioned enemy, Early was able to win the day and 
mitigate potential losses.  His tactics evidence that he remained cautious during his 
advance and subsequently preserved his fighting force.  If Early did not make a concerted 
effort to protect his fighting force, he could quickly find himself dramatically 
outnumbered far from any reinforcements.  It should be noted, when considering the roles 
of tactics and attrition that Wallace’s diminutive force did not possess enough troops to 
defend all the fords along the Monocacy River near Monocacy Junction.  If Wallace 
possessed the necessary troops to sufficiently extend his line, he may have prevented the 
Confederate flanking attack.  However, this numerical deficiency permitted Early to 
perform his flanking maneuvers quite effectively, which resulted in a northern defeat.  
This clash is excellent evidence of how tactics were dictated by the prospect of casualties 
and the role that numerical disparities played in the conduct of battle.  
The Federal defeat at Monocacy opened the route from Frederick, Maryland to 
Washington D.C. and Early’s Confederates seized the opportunity to move on the Union 
capital.  Wallace’s troops represented the last remaining Union army between the 
Confederates and the capital.  Although Early had achieved a victory, it only spurred the 
Union to bolster its defenses around Washington.  Early had achieved limited success by 
winning a minor battle at Monocacy, but he still desired to divert more attention from 
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Richmond and Petersburg.  Hoping to create disruption and calls for reinforcements to 
the Army of the Potomac, he made few efforts to disguise his movements as he marched 
toward Washington D.C. and by July 11, the southerners had reached the city’s outer 
defenses. 100  
It is not entirely clear what Early’s intentions were with regards to his assault on 
Washington D.C.  The city was well supplied, as it was not encircled or besieged in any 
way.  The city retained unimpeded access to the Potomac and necessary supplies arrived 
daily to feed the garrison there.  Furthermore, a ring of interconnected forts spanned the 
circumference of the capital protecting the city.  It was obvious, given the situation 
around Richmond and Petersburg, that besieging a city required inordinately large armies 
and access to an exponentially larger force than Early’s command.  Considering these 
factors, it stands to reason that Early had no real expectation of occupying or besieging 
the massive city.101  Despite Washington’s extensive defenses, it should be noted that the 
garrison had been significantly depleted as troops were pulled away from installations 
like Fort Stevens to support the Union siege at Petersburg.  Reports indicate that 
approximately 13,000 Federals were present to defend the capital during the battle of 
Monocacy.  This number, however, is not representative of the actual number of 
effective, usable troops available.102  Many of these were wounded or reserve units that 
were not in actuality capable of contributing to the Union defenses.  The number of 
effective combat troops spread throughout various forts was closer to 9,000, as Grant had 
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previously pulled units from these fortifications to replace casualties his force suffered at 
Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.103  This dilution of Federal troops garrisoned in 
Washington made the prospect of a successful Confederate attack at the very least 
plausible.104 
Although Early was able to keep his army together on the march from the 
southern Shenandoah Valley to Monocacy, he was not as successful in his traverse from 
Frederick to Washington.  By the time lead elements of Early’s army had arrived around 
the outskirts of the city, his troops were significantly disorganized, dispersed and they 
were exhausted, being detailed to tend to the wounded and prisoners.  Early even admits 
in his memoirs that a great many men were detailed to bury dead and escort the gravely 
wounded to the rear.105  The need to reorganize and address wounded and missing slowed 
the march to Washington for many units.  Rather than slow the advance of his entire 
army so as to keep his force together, Early permitted elements of his army to outpace the 
slower fatigued units, which spread his army out.  Here, fatigue and casualties played an 
important role in Confederate maneuvers as repercussions from the previous day’s battle 
hindered the Confederate advance.  In his memoirs, Early admits to detailing specific 
units with time-consuming tasks that delayed their march to Washington.  Early does 
exonerate himself of some blame as he expounds on the inordinately hot and dusty 
conditions, which slowed the march of the more fatigued units.106  The road to 
Washington is a superb example of the relationship between tactics and effects of 
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attrition.  Early allowed attrition and disorganization to spread his army out and he lost 
the ability to rapidly engage his entire force against the enemy. 
Early’s actions in Maryland spurred Grant to finally dispatch divisions from the 
VI and XIX corps to reinforce the positions around Washington.  By July 11, vessels 
carrying Union troops from Virginia arrived in Washington, D.C. almost at the same time 
as lead elements of Early’s Army of the Valley approached the city’s protective ring.107  
The initial phases of what would become known as the Battle of Fort Stevens are 
inextricably linked to the previous day’s march and ultimately the Battle of Monocacy.  
Although Early possessed a numerically superior force in total, he did not have the 
necessary troops on line to strike at the Union defense.  Early was forced to delay his 
assault on the northern stronghold, which gave the Federals the advantage of time to 
organize a defensive strategy.108  In his memoirs, General John B. Gordon explains the 
grave implications of Early’s late arrival as he notes that lead elements of the Confederate 
column saw that Fort Stevens was undermanned and could be easily taken if whole army 
had been present.  Gordon himself states that he saw entire breastworks left empty as the 
Union defenders awaited reinforcements.  Following Gordon’s critique of Early’s late 
arrival at Washington, he goes into an analysis of Early’s character and hints that perhaps 
Early lacked the courage necessary to go through with an attack of this nature.  Gordon’s 
estimation of Early’s tactical acumen would become progressively more negative as the 
campaign continued.109  Perhaps Gordon believed that Early’s thin columns and slow 
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march was not a mistake but in fact indicative of a deeper conservative timidity.  
Regardless of motivation, the results and implications of Early’s actions were the same.  
While the Confederates delayed, the Union enhanced their defenses at Fort Stevens and 
prepared for an enemy assault.110  Early does admit that when lead elements of his army 
arrived at Fort Stevens, the breastworks were “thinly manned”; however, this window of 
opportunity quickly closed with the arrival of Federal reinforcements.111  Grant stated 
after the war, “Early made his reconnaissance with a view of attacking on the following 
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our entrenchments, which were very 
strong, fully manned.”112  Early committed an error by allowing his army to arrive late 
and piecemeal, but he also made another tactical error by delaying his assault, which only 
made the prospect of a successful attack more precarious.  
The Confederates were at a significant disadvantage as they prepared to assault 
the Federals in a well-fortified position.  Fort Stevens was an imposing fortification that 
boasted nearly 20 heavy artillery pieces nestled behind extensive trenches and 
embankments.  The Union had designed the position to act as a strong point that could 
dominate the northern approach to Washington.  They cleared potential avenues of attack 
around the fort so as to prevent an enemy from having any cover from the fort’s 
artillery.113  Furthermore, the Confederates did not enjoy the numerical superiority, as 
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combat capable Confederates numbered approximately 10,000.  Union forces, well 
positioned behind imposing fortifications, numbered almost 9,000.114   
Early could have opted for a full-blown assault, which would have required his 
troops to cross a large open field while exposed to fire, during which the Union batteries 
could easily cut large swaths in the Confederate battle line.  The remaining troops that 
survived the charge and Federal barrage would then need to scale the steep 
embankment.115  If the southerners reached the fort, they would face a significant number 
of Federals that would not easily relinquish control of the position.  Compared to the 
minor casualties sustained by the Confederates at Monocacy, an assault on Fort Stevens 
could possibly cripple Early’s ability to continue operations north of the Potomac 
River.116   
Given the potential for significant Confederate losses, it behooved Early to 
implement a more conservative strategy.  On the afternoon of July 11, Early initiated a 
series of probing measures that would allow him to gauge the strength of the Union 
position.  Similar to his tactics at Monocacy, it was important for Early to gain necessary 
intelligence so as to avoid needless risk to his force.  The Confederates deployed a series 
of skirmish lines that were to ascertain the location and troop strength of Federal units 
around the fort.117  However, any intelligence that the Confederates gathered could not be 
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immediately acted upon as Early was still waiting for the remainder of his spread-out 
force to arrive on the battlefield. 
Because Early commenced his attack the evening of July 11, he allowed the 
Federals to confirm the exact location of the Confederate attack.  Prior to the Confederate 
advance on Fort Stevens, Union leaders remained uncertain whether Fort Stevens, or one 
of the other defensive fortifications ringing Washington, would be the intended target.  
The Confederate skirmish line gave away Early’s intention to attack Fort Stevens, which 
spurred the Union to bolster the units defending the fort.118  By the evening of July 11, 
additional elements of the VI and XIX corps arrived to reinforce the existing defenders.  
Early’s decision to initiate skirmishing and demonstrate intent to attack Fort Stevens 
without his entire fighting force represents a tactical mistake, as it eliminated the prospect 
of a Confederate surprise attack once Early’s entire force had assembled.119  If Early had 
delayed his probing maneuvers until the remainder of his army had arrived, it may have 
increased the possibility of mounting a successful assault.  Furthermore, the Confederates 
did not begin their attack until around 2:30 p.m. on July 11.120  Beginning operations this 
late in the day limited the opportunity to press any attack to its full potential as a 
Confederate advance could be derailed by nightfall.  Engaging his troops late in the day 
combined with the lack of his entire force present represents two tactical errors that could 
have cost the Confederates dearly.121   
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Despite the mistake of engaging the enemy without his entire army present, Early 
did avoid some important pitfalls.  On July 11, the Confederates limited their offensive 
maneuvers to basic skirmishing, which kept the majority of Early’s troops out of any 
significant danger.  Early’s probing tactics were relatively low risk maneuvers, as his 
skirmish lines were not concentrated enough to suffer heavy casualties.  Part way through 
the evening, the clash became a duel of sorts between Confederate snipers and Union 
artillery.  Finally, night fell and the skirmishing continued but did not lead to any 
significant action.  Early’s decision not to press any large scale attack in this instance is 
to be applauded as it certainly may have resulted in significant Confederate losses.  He 
resisted the opportunity to attack and in doing so, preserved his fighting force.122  By 
performing a full-scale attack on the Union position, the Confederates certainly may have 
made an already risky situation into a very costly one.  Given the existing evidence it is 
plausible that Early never really intended to attack Washington, but simply lingered long 
enough to pull additional Union reinforcements from Petersburg.  In this sense Early’s 
actions were quite successful as he managed to achieve an important goal at little cost.123   
On the morning of July 12 Early resumed his scattered skirmishing tactics with 
Federal units around Fort Stevens.  The Confederates did not have any extensive or 
complex strategy at this point other than to test the Union strength and attempt to 
determine what, if any, potential weaknesses existed in the Federal line.  The 
Confederates resumed their sniping tactics from nearby houses and buildings that were 
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within rifle range of the Union line.124  Following a few hours of the oppressive 
Confederate sniping, the Federals reinitiated their artillery bombardment and significantly 
damaged many of the homes and buildings the Confederates had been using for cover. 
Despite the relatively effective artillery barrage, the Confederates were able to hold their 
position and maintain their fire on the Federals’ position.  The major action of the day 
came around 4 p.m. when Brigadier General Daniel Bidwell was dispatched to quell the 
Confederate harassment with a frontal assault.125  Bidwell’s brigade stepped off under 
withering Confederate fire and immediately began to sustain significant casualties as 
their battle line was exposed to heavy Confederate rifle fire.  As the Union brigade neared 
the Confederate position, they had also become the target of southern artillery and their 
casualties began to increase exponentially.  Despite the highly effective Confederate fire 
the Federals were able to push the remaining southerners from their position in the rubble 
and drive them from the field.126  
The action at Fort Stevens did not produce significant casualties, but certainly had 
profound effects for both sides as the Confederates gained increased attention from the 
Union high command.  By the end of the two-day battle, the Confederates had suffered 
approximately 550 casualties.  The northerners sustained around 400 dead and wounded 
with the majority of casualties incurred during Bidwell’s assault on the Confederate 
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position.  Early ordered his troops to pull out of their positions around Fort Stevens the 
night of July 12, thus concluding the battle.
The late arrival of a percentage of Early’s force to
important mistake that can be directly linked to the casualties the Confederates incurred 
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at Monocacy.  Furthermore, Early’s decision to begin his assault so late in the day on July 
11 certainly limited the chances for the Confederates to exploit any weakness they 
discovered in the Union line.  Despite these important errors, Early managed to mitigate 
casualties, preserve the effectiveness of his force, and continue his campaign.  Rather 
than force an attack that would have yielded heavy casualties, Early opted to maintain a 
presence around Washington, which warranted a deeper Union commitment to the 
defenses around the capital by drawing troops away from the siege at Petersburg.  Rather 
than risking his entire army to capture Fort Stevens and Washington, Early took a more 
conservative approach by prolonging a threat to the city.  In doing this, Early fulfilled a 
portion of Lee’s initial order to threaten Washington and draw troops away from the area 
around Petersburg and Richmond.129  
The clash around Fort Stevens is an excellent example of the role of attrition 
directly influenced Early’s tactics.  It is also evident that his battle plan was designed so 
as to limit potential casualties and to preserve his fighting force.  Many historians agree 
that Early could have taken Fort Stevens, but would have sustained heavy casualties in 
doing so.  It is also questionable as to what extent Early’s operations would have 
benefitted from this costly attack.  Given the size of Early’s force it is improbable that 
they could have occupied D.C. for very long as Grant would have likely rushed 
reinforcements from Petersburg that would require the Confederates to make a hasty 
retreat.  Early’s tactics achieved the desired result of draining Union troops from Virginia 
while simultaneously limiting casualties.130  In this sense, the action around Washington 
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can be deemed a Confederate success as it fulfilled Lee’s order without the high cost of 
casualties and subsequent attrition. 
By July 13, the Confederates returned across the Potomac River into Virginia and 
began to make their way back toward Winchester. Although the Confederates had 
withdrawn, the Federals defending Washington were not content with mere Confederate 
retreat.  Major General Horatio G. Wright rapidly mounted a pursuit force to attack Early 
in his traverse back to the Shenandoah Valley.  Wright organized elements of the VI and 
XIX Corps to pursue the Confederates in hopes that they could trap the southerners 
before they reached the relative safety of the Shenandoah Valley.131  Early’s army was 
attempting to reach a pass in the Blue Ridge Mountains known as Snickers Gap where he 
hoped to re-enter the Valley.  The pursuing Federals realized this was Early’s intended 
route and hoped to reach the southerners before they crossed the mountains.  The arrival 
of elements of the Army of West Virginia, which also sought to cut Early’s retreat off 
before he reached the pass, reinforced Wrights pursuing troops.132  
Early immediately implemented a series of screening maneuvers that were 
designed to protect his flanks and allow the bulk of his army to continue moving toward 
safety.  Federal units, from the front and rear, slowly encircled the Confederates and it 
was imperative that the southerners kept moving to avoid being trapped.133  Early 
dispatched Brigadier General John B. McCausland’s cavalry to protect the retreating 
Confederate’s left flank, while Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s division operated to the rear 
of the retreating Confederate column to ensure that Union cavalry did not reach the 
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vulnerable Confederates from behind.134  Lastly, Brigadier General Bradley Johnson was 
tasked with protecting the southerners’ right flank and ensured that no elements of 
Wright’s force could strike the northern portion of Early’s column.  This elaborate 
screening maneuver represents a brilliant use of Early’s resources so as to ensure the 
forward movement of his army.135  With the encroachment of enemies from the rear and 
west of Early’s position, he demonstrated a high degree of competence as he orchestrated 
a myriad of elements so as to prevent a battle.  It is evident that Early did not want to 
fight at what became known as Heaton’s Crossroads.  His tactics indicate that he was 
continuously attempting to disengage from the enemy rather than form his troops for an 
assault.  In his memoirs Early indicates that he did not wish to turn and fight during his 
withdrawal, but merely attempt to keep his army moving and to deny the Federals an 
opportunity to fully engage his force.136  Despite being in Virginia, the Confederates still 
operated in enemy held territory and were in a precarious position to stage a battle as 
elements of two Federal armies moved closer.137 
Early’s maneuvering at Heaton’s Crossroads demonstrates a superb effort to avoid 
a fight and further exhibits Early’s desire to operate in a fashion that did not put his army 
at risk of heavy casualties.  As the day progressed, the Federals made multiple efforts to 
probe the Confederate screen, but were continuously repulsed.  Although the Federals 
made multiple efforts to find a weakness and hinder the Confederate’s forward 
progression, they ultimately failed.  By the end of the day Early had achieved his 
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intended goal of reaching the gap and crossing into the Shenandoah.138  Early’s casualty-
preventing efforts limited what could have been a full-scale Federal attack into little more 
than general harassment.139  
The action around Heaton’s Crossroads demonstrates the direct correlation 
between conservative tactics and subsequent low casualties.  The Confederates, in this 
instance, made a concerted effort to avoid a fight and it paid off as they avoided multiple 
attempts by Wright to trap Early up against the approaching Army of West Virginia.140  
Rather than endeavoring to engage elements of the approaching Union force, Early 
mitigated potential attrition and once again preserved his force’s ability to fight at a later 
date.   
Including the action at Heaton’s Crossroads, the Confederates clashed with Union 
pursuers three times from July 16 to July 20 At Snicker’s Ferry on July 18, the 
withdrawing Confederates once again repulsed a Union attack and allowed Early to 
continue his retreat into the Shenandoah.  By July 20, elements of Early’s army had 
reached Winchester, Virginia and were ordered to remain within the city.  Confederate 
intelligence alerted Major General Stephen Dodson Ramseur of a small Union contingent 
of approximately 2,500 troops.  Seeing an opportunity to strike at this smaller unit, 
Ramseur enticed the Federals closer, baiting them with a thin skirmish line.   Ramseur 
then moved out of the city’s defenses toward Rutherford’s Farm and sought to surprise 
the approaching Federals.  Ramseur, however, was acting alone and outside the direction 
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of Early.141  The Confederates were promptly routed from the field when Ramseur 
initiated a poorly executed surprise attack that was flanked by the approaching Union 
troops.  Ramseur had been acting independently from the remainder of the Confederate 
force and did not have the necessary troop strength to effectively extend his line and 
prevent a Union flanking maneuver.  This insubordination cost the Confederates the 
battle and approximately 600 casualties.  The action at Rutherford’s Farm is an excellent 
example of the direct correlation between poor tactics and resulting heavy casualties.  
Ramseur operated without support from the rest of Early’s force, which put his division 
at risk and resulted in eventual defeat.  Although this clash had little effect on the overall 
conduct of the campaign, it stands as an excellent microanalysis of the relationship of 
tactics and subsequent casualties.142  
Following this defeat, Early moved his army 15 miles south to Fisher’s Hill, 
Virginia in an effort to reorganize after days of pursuit from Union forces.  The 
Confederate retreat left the northern portion of the Valley open to a Union incursion.  The 
southerners’ withdrawal from Winchester suggested to Wright that the immediate 
Confederate threat to the capital had been eliminated and that it was safe for the Union VI 
and XIX Corps to return to the siege around Petersburg.143  One of Early’s primary tasks 
was to ensure that the Union maintained a presence in the Shenandoah Valley so as to 
deplete Federal resources encircling Petersburg.  Early recognized that he needed to 
continue operations against the Federals to prevent their return to Ulysses S. Grant’s 
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siege efforts.  Wright had left the Army of West Virginia to act as a sentinel in the 
northern Shenandoah Valley, and Early saw the smaller Army of West Virginia under the 
command of General George Crook as a viable target and sought to engage Crook’s army 
encamped near Kernstown, Virginia.144  
On July 24, Early rapidly marched his entire army down the Valley toward 
Crook’s force.  Here Early demonstrated a high degree of competence and tactical 
acumen as he swiftly moved his large force approximately thirteen miles.145  He did not 
make the same mistake of allowing his army to become dispersed, as he had in his march 
from Monocacy to Washington.  It should be noted that Early’s march from Fisher’s Hill 
to Kernstown was not constrained by the same variables as his traverse from Monocacy.  
Unlike the march to D.C., attrition in the form of casualties and general disorganization 
did not hamper the movement to Kernstown, and this allowed Early to arrive with his 
entire army on the battlefield rather than engaging the Union piecemeal as he had done at 
Fort Stevens.146   
Once at Kernstown, Early utilized the local topography to his advantage.  The 
Confederates formed a large battle line anchored by Major General John B. Gordon’s 
infantry division.  The Confederate left was comprised of Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s 
division, which Early had wisely anchored on a series of rough hills that acted as a 
natural barrier to Union flanking attempts.  In his memoir Early indicates the tactical 
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importance of anchoring his left on these topographical undulations so as to prevent a 
Federal flanking maneuver.  Early explains that this action may have saved the day and 
ensured a southern victory as the Union was unable to compromise the Confederate left.  
Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton’s division made up Early’s right flank.147  The size of 
the Confederate force was still unknown to Crook and he was uncertain whether Early’s 
entire army was in fact present on the battlefield.  Early masterfully dispatched a 
contingent of skirmishers to draw Crook’s force toward the Confederate line.  
Miscommunication within the Federal chain of command resulted in a disorganized 
attack and the well-positioned Confederate line repulsed various halfhearted Federal 
assaults.148  Finally, during a Federal attack by Brigadier General James Mulligan’s 
division, the Confederates discerned a weakness in the approaching Union line.  John 
Gordon’s division immediately exploited a gap in Mulligan’s battle line and charged 
through the void.  This action broke the advancing Union line and forced each Federal 
unit into headlong retreat.149   
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Of the 13,000 Confederates present at Kernstown, Early suffered approximately 
500 dead, wounded, or missing.  The 9,000 troops under Crook had significantly heavier
casualties of about 1,300.  What would come to be known as the Second Battle of 
Kernstown is an excellent example of how Early implemented conservative offensive 
tactics that did not put his force at unnecessary risk.
Early raced his army up to Kernstown then enticed the enemy to attack the Confederate 
position on ground of Early’s choosing.  The use of Confederate skirmishers to invite a 
Union advance worked splendidly and is an excellent example of a conservative assault 
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that limited potential losses.151  Furthermore, it should be noted that Early’s decision to 
anchor his flank on a topographical feature saved his line from a Union flanking 
maneuver.  In addition to these successful decisions, it must be reiterated how effectively 
Early was able to move his army thirteen miles so quickly and without the disbursement 
of his force.152 
Early took this Union defeat as an opportunity to press his advance north and 
operate as a raiding force in Union-held territory.  Even as he began his retreat back into 
the Shenandoah Valley, Early dispatched two cavalry divisions under Brigadier General 
John McCausland to raid points north in Pennsylvania and Maryland. The Confederate 
cavalry made good use of the Federal retreat at Second Kernstown and capitalized on the 
unprotected town of Chambersburg.  Following the town’s inability to pay a $500,000 
ransom demand, the Confederates burned the city, which garnered the attention of 
northern newspapers and politicians.153  Following the razing of the Chambersburg town 
center, the Confederate raiding party continued to disrupt Union communication and 
transport lines until finally returning to the remainder of Early’s army in mid-August.154 
July to August 1864 was a dynamic and bloody time for both the Union and 
Confederate units operating in and around the Shenandoah Valley.  Early had exploited 
numerous opportunities to strike at the Federals and succeeded both in disrupting Union 
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activity north of the Shenandoah Valley as well threatening Washington D.C.  The result 
of Early’s action was exactly what Lee had desired and instructed in his orders.  Early’s 
disruption north of the Potomac River garnered the attention of Grant and others so as to 
warrant that a contingent of the forces laying siege to Petersburg be dispatched to address 
the Confederate threat.   
It is clear, given an analysis of the major clashes during this campaign that an 
inextricable interplay between tactics and numerical disparities as a result of attrition 
most certainly exists.  It is necessary to acknowledge that in many instances the two are 
determinative factors in the outcome of battles during this campaign.  The intent of this 
analysis is not to oversimplify but to elucidate the causal relationship between tactics and 
attrition.  It is clear that divorcing the role of tactics or attrition from a comprehensive 
understanding of this campaign is impossible. 
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Chapter Three:  Sheridan’s Valley Campaign 
Feelings of desperation became increasingly prevalent as the noose tightened 
around the besieged Confederate Army of Northern Virginia in the region around 
Richmond.  The southern army under Robert E. Lee had been defending the Confederate 
capital and was struggling to maintain control of the city.  In June, Lee had hoped to 
alleviate the pressure on the Confederate defenses as he dispatched Jubal Early’s corps 
into the Shenandoah Valley.  Despite some mistakes, Early had successfully disrupted 
Union operations in northwestern Virginia and had created quite a panic when his force 
threatened the defensive ring around Washington D.C.  The victory at Monocacy and the 
burning of Chambersburg also garnered further attention from the Union high command, 
but they failed to relieve the pressure on Lee.155   
 The threat of a Confederate attack on Washington spurred Ulysses S. Grant to 
dispatch reinforcements from Petersburg to bolster defenses around the city.  Although 
Washington was successfully defended, Early’s army was recognized as a serious threat 
and Grant wished to address northern concerns by swiftly neutralizing Early’s force.  It is 
important to note that Grant’s decision to dispatch one of his most competent generals 
directly correlated to Early’s successes in the previous months.  Early’s fulfillment of 
Lee’s directive to disrupt Union operations forced Grant to take the threat seriously and 
thus led to Early’s ultimate demise.156  Confederate victories and the burning of 
Chambersburg motivated a more concerted Federal response, which spurred a meeting 
between Ulysses S. Grant and Abraham Lincoln at Fort Monroe on July 31, 1864.  They 
sought to shut down Confederate operations in the Shenandoah Valley and eliminate the 
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ability for Early to continue his raids.157  The New York Times began to refer to the 
Shenandoah Valley as the “back door” by which the Confederacy had repeatedly struck 
the Union.158  In an effort to shut this “back door,” Lincoln and Grant agreed to dispatch 
Phillip Sheridan and a large army to destroy Early’s force.  Lincoln remarked in a 
dispatch to Grant that he sincerely approved of Sheridan being given command of the 
region and stated, “I have seen your dispatch in which you say, ‘I want Sheridan put in 
command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, 
and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.’ This, I 
think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move.”159   By August 8 Sheridan had 
arrived in the Harpers Ferry along with his force of approximately 50,000 troops.160 
 Sheridan’s large force was different from the Union armies that Early encountered 
in the previous months.  For instance, the Union force under Lew Wallace at Monocacy 
was ill equipped to challenge Early’s larger army.  Furthermore, many units that the 
Confederates encountered were much smaller than the southern force and therefore 
operated in a reactionary fashion as they attempted to defend against Early’s marauding 
contingent.  Sheridan’s army, however, was specifically tasked with addressing the 
Confederate army operating in the Shenandoah Valley and preventing it from effectively 
continuing operations in the region.  Although Early’s actions had resulted in a 
realignment of Union forces, it quickly became evident to Lee that he would be required 
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to bolster Early so that the Army of the Valley could viably challenge Sheridan’s new 
task force.  Lee dispatched three brigades to reinforce Early’s army, thus setting the stage 
for the first clash of what would become known as Sheridan’s Valley Campaign.161 
 By August 16, 1864, elements of the reinforcements that Lee had sent from 
Petersburg had spread out in their march to join Early.  As Confederate Brigadier General 
William Wofford’s brigade made its way through the small river town of Front Royal 
Virginia, it encountered a much larger Union contingent comprised of three brigades.  
Two of these brigades consisted of infantry units while one was Federal cavalry.162  
Wofford’s brigade had become detached from the remainder of the Confederate force 
sent from Petersburg and was subsequently operating independently without the ability to 
rely on reinforcements if a precarious situation arose.  This dispersion of troops was a 
serious mistake as it limited the potential for the Confederates to gain numerical 
superiority over an opposing force. 
 Upon encountering a Union picket line directly north of Front Royal, the 
Confederates immediately gave chase rather than attempting to gauge the size of the 
Union force.  Furthermore, the Confederates avidly pursued the Federal sentries instead 
of attempting to determine the exact position of the main Federal force.163  The failure of 
the Confederates to successfully acquire vitally important intelligence represents a 
tactical error as it set the southerners up for a surprise counter assault.  As the southerners 
pursued the fleeing Union pickets, they became dispersed and their lines progressively 
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thinned as they crossed various topographic obstacles.164  The terrain north of Front 
Royal possesses many natural obstacles such as hills, ravines, and water crossings that 
made the maneuvering of troops quite difficult.  Further, there existed few bridges or 
fords where the Shenandoah River and various tributaries could be crossed.  This made 
the movements of the advancing Confederates quite predictable to the Federals and they 
quickly prepared to repulse the southern threat.165   
 Despite the adverse terrain, the Confederates continued their pursuit and were 
quickly situated at the base of a steep prominent feature known as Guard Hill.  Union 
Brigadier General Thomas C. Devin’s cavalry had positioned themselves along the base 
of the strong point and the Confederates did not possess the numerical strength to 
perform a frontal assault on the Union position.166  The Confederate commanders erred 
when they permitted their assault to become diluted due to the chaos of battle and the 
rough terrain.  Rather than regrouping, the Confederates attempted a flanking maneuver 
that required wading across Crooked Run, a chest high stream that runs along the base of 
Guard Hill.167  Here the Confederates made yet another tactical error, as they did not gain 
enough intelligence before committing their force to a flanking maneuver over unknown 
territory.168   
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Wofford ordered his troops through the stream but upon reaching the other side, 
they were immediately counterattacked by two brigades of Federal infantry.  At this point 
the Confederates were outnumbered nearly three to one and did not possess the combat 
power to challenge the Union brigades.  The Confederates were now trapped between the 
advancing Federals and Crooked Run as they attempted to funnel back across the creek.  
Had the Confederates probed the Union position more extensively they may have realized 
the presence of the two additional infantry brigades.169  The failure to perform necessary 
reconnaissance put the Confederates at a greater disadvantage, as they were unprepared 
for the Federal assault.170  There is no excuse for Wofford’s mistake, as he should have 
known the tactical implications of trapping himself on the enemy side of a waterway.  As 
the Federal infantry brigades advanced many southern units were enveloped and 
captured.  As the remainder of Wofford’s force attempted to escape, Union Brigadier 
General George Custer arrived on the field with reinforcements further accentuating the 
numerical disparity between the two armies.  The Confederates were forced into 
headlong retreat as they were now severely outnumbered.171   
Although the majority of Wofford’s force escaped the Union counterattack, 
approximately 500 were captured or killed.  Confederate losses were in fact quite high 
when compared to roughly 100 Union casualties.  This clash is an excellent example of 
how numerical disparities, as a result of dilution and attrition, combined with tactical 
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errors resulted in a disastrous situation for the Confederates.172  The dispersing of troops 
on the way to the Shenandoah Valley from Petersburg set Wofford’s brigade up for a 
scenario where they would not be able to capitalize on an opportunity due to the lack of 
manpower.  The engagement at Guard Hill is a superb example of the relationship 
between the effects of attrition and battlefield tactics as the southerners committed a 
series of grave errors that prevented them from accurately ascertaining the enemy’s 
strength and position, thus resulting in heavy losses.173   
Despite the heavy southern casualties, this engagement had little effect on the 
overall campaign as the Confederates resumed their march toward the remainder of Jubal 
Early’s army.  Five days after the battle at Guard Hill, the two armies once again clashed 
at what is now Summit Point, West Virginia.  On August 21, 1864, Early devised a plan 
to strike at Sheridan’s army encamped around Charles Town, West Virginia.  Early 
ordered an elaborate flanking attack and split his force into two wings.  Early would 
command one wing while he ceded control of the other to Major General Richard H. 
Anderson.174  Early hoped to flank either side of the Union position outside of Charles 
Town and converge with the two segments of his force simultaneously on either side of 
the Federals.175   
Early’s tactic relied on a well-synchronized movement of units to maximize the 
number of available troops for combat.  The Confederate maneuvering targeted a small 
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portion of Sheridan’s force to ensure that the southerners would have a numerical 
advantage.  This flanking endeavor represents a sound tactical decision as it mitigated the 
Confederate deficiencies in manpower.  Furthermore, Early was tasked with orchestrating 
an array of moving parts that made his tactical equation quite complex.  The Federals, 
however, enjoyed the benefit of a defensive position that did not require them to 
coordinate elaborate troop movements.   
The initial Confederate attack was relatively successful as it surprised a segment 
of Sheridan’s force; however, after initial contact, the Confederate onslaught stalled as 
the Federals quickly countered the southern attack with a series of controlled retreats that 
were designed to delay the southern advance.  Major General James Wilson’s cavalry 
division quickly repulsed Anderson’s column.  Wilson’s division effectively screened the 
Federal withdrawal rendering Anderson’s assault ineffective.  Early’s wing met 
resistance from elements of the VI Corps that replicated Wilson’s screening maneuvers.  
Together the Federals progressively disengaged with the Confederate attackers in an 
attempt to prematurely conclude the engagement. Rather than pressing the advance, Early 
opted for a cautious approach that would limit potential losses.  While the Federals 
continued their delaying actions, Early was wise not to commit the majority of his troops 
and by the evening of August 21, neither of the armies had suffered significant casualties.  
By the following morning, the engagement was concluded when Sheridan’s force moved 
approximately three miles east to the small hamlet of Halltown, West Virginia.176 
Despite the inconclusive result of this clash, Early did avoid heavy casualties by 
operating in a fashion that avoided putting his army at undue risk.  The Confederate’s 
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initial plan relied on isolating a smaller portion of Sheridan’s larger force thus balancing 
the numerical scale in the favor of the southerners.  Although this maneuvering did not 
yield the results that Early had initially desired he did not make a poor situation into a 
disastrous one.  Early could have pressed his attack on the evening of August 21 as the 
Federals drew the southerners closer to the main body of Sheridan’s army.  This would 
have placed Early’s force in a precarious position, as the Confederates would be in 
danger of being enveloped by the numerically superior Union army.177  In this regard, 
Early demonstrated sound tactical decision-making as he limited the potential for defeat 
and attrition.  By the end of the day, the Confederates suffered only 500 casualties, while 
the Federals sustained approximately 700 losses.  These low casualties are further 
evidence that both armies sought to avoid the pernicious effects of attrition and preserve 
their fighting forces.178 
On August 28, Early’s force encountered a cavalry division at Smithfield 
Crossing under the command of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt.  The Confederates 
promptly pushed the Union troopers north until Federal reinforcements arrived which 
inhibited the Confederate assault.179  Here again, Early broke off the attack when Union 
reinforcements deprived the southerners of the numerical advantage.  Following the 
action at Smithfield Crossing, Early moved the remainder of his force south to 
Winchester, Virginia.180  Sheridan promptly followed Early south and positioned his 
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army approximately 3 miles west of the Confederates.  Seeing an opportunity to strike at 
Sheridan’s force, Early dispatched Major General Joseph Kershaw’s division to test the 
Federal position and determine the strength and location of Sheridan’s units.  Rather than 
committing his entire force to an uncertain situation, the Confederate commander opted 
for a more cautious approach that only risked one of his divisions.  This lowered the 
potential for heavy casualties as it kept the majority of Early’s army out of the fight.181   
On the evening of September 3 at around 4:30 P.M. Kershaw assaulted Joseph 
Thoburn’s division of the VIII Corps situated directly west of the Federal force.  The 
decision to initiate the attack so late in the day was problematic as it limited the 
opportunity for the Confederates to exploit any weaknesses in the Union line before 
nightfall.  Nonetheless, Kershaw’s Division moved forward and engaged in heavy 
skirmishing for the next few hours.182  Here, Kershaw exhibited sound tactical reasoning, 
as he simply maintained sporadic contact with the enemy but did not initiate a full-scale 
assault, as he did not possess the troop strength to break the Union line without incurring 
heavy casualties of his own.  Once again, numerical strength and the prospect of 
casualties were dictating the tactics of Early’s army.  Realizing the need to achieve 
numerical supremacy both sides quickly rushed in reinforcements; however, this 
achieved very little as nightfall forced a premature end to the fighting.  Early’s decision 
to bolster Kershaw’s division was instrumental in avoiding a Confederate defeat as 
Kershaw’s unit had suffered over 300 casualties and was in danger of being severely 
outnumbered when further Union reinforcements arrived.  It is clear that Early’s decision, 
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motivated by an aversion to attrition, leveled the playing field and prevented a potentially 
disastrous situation.183 
On the morning of September 4, both sides had heavily reinforced their lines and 
the Federals occupied a well-fortified defensive position with extensive earthworks.  The 
topography in this region is wrought with steep undulations and interconnected ravines, 
which limited the avenues of approach for a Confederate attack.184  These topographical 
constraints along with the numerical superiority of Sheridan’s force made the prospect of 
a southern assault quite precarious.185  Maps produced by Early’s chief cartographer 
Jedediah Hotchkiss indicate that any Confederate advance would be funneled into narrow 
avenues of attack, which would make the approaching southern lines easy targets for 
Union artillery.  Early avoided this costly endeavor and withdrew his army thus 
concluding what would become known as the Battle of Berryville. 
The relationship between tactics and the prospect of casualties and other forms of 
attrition is readily apparent in the opening stages of Sheridan’s Valley Campaign.  The 
cautious sparring of both armies directly resulted in relatively insignificant overall 
casualties.  The clash at Berryville is a superb example of the correlation between 
cautious well-implemented tactics and low rates of attrition as neither side suffered over 
400 casualties in this engagement.186  
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The inconclusive results of the previous week’s battles did not deter 
capitalizing on a new opportunity.  Following Early’s retreat from Washington and his 
subsequent return to the northern Shenandoah Valley, he had done little to fulfill Lee’s 
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directive of disrupting Union operations.  Aside from the razing of Chambersburg, little 
had been done to warrant the presence of Sheridan’s army of 50,000 men.  Early’s 
relatively unobtrusive movements can, to some extent, be attributed to the increased 
Union presence in the region as Sheridan’s powerful force severely inhibited Confederate 
operations.  Following the Battle of Berryville, Early wished to replicate his successful 
raiding missions from earlier in the year and sought to take an expeditionary force north 
and strike at the Union railroad network.  Despite the proximity of Sheridan’s force, the 
Confederate commander sought to strike at the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad hub located in 
what is now Martinsburg, West Virginia.188  In order to do this, Early would need to 
move elements of his army north from Winchester in order to stage a successful raid 
against the Union depot.  This would require Early to discreetly maneuver his army north 
without alerting Sheridan of his intent to raid West Virginia.  Although Early wished to 
covertly reach Martinsburg, his movements were hindered in several important ways.189  
The primary route that a large army could use from Winchester to the B&O was the 
Valley Pike, which was adequate for the movement of artillery and ancillary wagons.  
Although this road was ideal for rapidly moving an army, it was the only viable route that 
a force of Early’s size could use to travel up and down the Valley.  This meant that 
movement was relatively predictable and Sheridan’s pickets could rapidly discern Early’s 
intent to strike north.190  
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Despite the predictability of Early’s movements, he opted to move approximately 
19,000 men up the Valley Pike on September 19, 1864.  In their journey to reach the 
B&O, the Confederate column began to spread out along the road.  It is unclear exactly 
why this was permitted to happen, but it proved to be a fatal mistake.  It is difficult to 
ascertain if Early intended for the dispersing of his troops in order to protect his supply 
lines and avenue of retreat.  The proximity of Sheridan’s much larger force of 50,000 
men may have spurred Early to protect his supply lines by leaving units to act as pickets 
in the event of a Federal advance.  The second explanation for the dispersing of Early’s 
corps is a simple inability to keep his force together over the long march.  Perhaps Early 
did not emphasize the importance of concentrating his units to his lieutenants, which 
subsequently resulted in the thinning of his force.  This was Early’s first tactical error of 
what would become known as the Third Battle of Winchester.  The dilution of Early’s 
force reduced the combat effectiveness of his army as no single unit was adequately 
supported to exploit opportunities or defend against attacks.  This mistake is quite similar 
to Early’s error during his march from Monocacy Junction to Washington D.C. where he 
also permitted the thinning of his army.191  Grant, in his memoirs, “Early had invited this 
attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy.”  Grant went on to state, 
“But his forces were separated and, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell 
back to Fisher’s Hill, Sheridan following.”192  Even Grant, years later, recognized Early’s 
error of permitting his force to thin out in their raiding mission.    
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Early’s significantly smaller and diluted contingent was an easy target for 
Sheridan, and the Federals quickly mobilized to strike at the vulnerable Confederate 
column.  Sheridan’s army camped around Berryville raced toward the rear portion of 
Early’s force just north of Winchester at Stephenson’s Depot.193  Sheridan indicated in 
his memoirs, “he promptly proceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions within 
supporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryville pike about two miles 
east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek and Red Bud Run.”  This is clear evidence 
that Sheridan recognized the implications of Early spreading out his army and 
demonstrates Sheridan’s ability to discern weaknesses in his opponent.  Despite 
Sheridan’s intent of surprising the Confederates, the topography between Berryville and 
Winchester was not conducive to the rapid movement of Sheridan’s force and the 
Federals quickly became clogged in the steep ravines, which acted as bottlenecks.  
Sheridan should have realized the topographical constraints of his intended route, which 
severely inhibited his approach.  This tactical error gave Early the necessary time to 
reconnoiter and move the remainder of his raiding force south to meet the Federal 
assault.194   
Early, however, made a fatal error almost as soon as elements of Sheridan’s force 
made contact with his column.  Early opted to fight at Winchester, however, prior to the 
clash the majority of Early’s army was on the Valley Pike and enjoyed relative ease of 
movement.  Early should have retained his force and continued to move south, 
disengaging from Sheridan’s surprise attack all together and allowing Early to select 
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better ground further south.  If Early had retreated south he may have been able to defend 
positions around Fisher’s Hill or Front Royal where the topography was more favorable.  
However, it is plausible that after weeks of sparring both commanders desired an 
opportunity to crush their opponents in a full-fledged encounter.  It is also possible that 
Early did not realize Sheridan had over 40,000 men at his disposal and the Confederate 
commander simply underestimated the severity of the Federal threat.  Prior to this 
engagement Early had only encountered smaller elements of Sheridan’s force and he may 
have erroneously assumed he was once again engaging only a segment of the Sheridan’s 
army.195  
The Confederates were, however, able to marshal a substantial number of their 
troops to meet the oncoming Federal attack, but many Confederate units were still spread 
out in their march back toward Winchester.  Early highlighted the dilution of his force in 
his memoirs by pointing out that Gordon did not arrive on the field until approximately 
10:00 A.M. and his late arrival contributed to the overall chaos of trying to organize a 
cohesive Confederate defense.  Here Early’s late decision to consolidate his force began 
to cause problems as the Confederates were severely outnumbered and desperately 
needed reinforcements.196  If Early had concentrated his force to begin with, he would 
have had all available troops to quell Sheridan’s frontal assault.  Gordon pointed out 
Early’s mistake in his memoirs by stating, “The reports of the Federal approach, 
however, did not seem to impress General Early, and he delayed the order for 
concentration until Sheridan was upon him, ready to devour him piecemeal, a division at 
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a time.”197  In his memoir, Early lamented the Confederate numerical inferiority when he 
stated, “It was a moment of imminent and thrilling danger, as it was impossible for 
Ramseur’s division, which numbered only about 1,700 muskets, to withstand the 
immense force advancing against it.”198  Here a combination of Early’s piecemeal tactics 
and Sheridan’s overwhelming force began to create conditions for a potential 
Confederate defeat.199       
Despite this crisis, the Confederates hurriedly constructed breastworks and 
utilized the terrain to their benefit.  Early anchored his right flank atop a series of hills, 
which presented an imposing obstacle for the Federals.200  Early’s effective use of 
topography helped mitigate the Confederate deficiencies in manpower and offered his 
troops increased protection from enemy fire.  His decision to hold these hills was a 
superb tactical maneuver as it severely inhibited Sheridan’s routes of advance. 
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Although the Confederate right was well positioned
vulnerable state.  The southern center consisted of one infantry division under Major 
General John B. Gordon.  Gordon’s division benefitted from little protection such as 
breastworks and trenches.
made it difficult for Confederate artillery on the other side to observe and cover Gordon’s 
position.  Although Gordon’s men could readily engage an approaching Federal attack, 
they were unable to benefit from artillery suppor
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enjoyed no tactical supremacy by occupying this position.  This disorganization was a 
costly tactical mistake as it left Gordon’s infantry unsupported.     Following a frontal 
assault by Major General William Emory’s XIX Corps, Gordon’s line began to crumble 
into retreat.203  This blunder resulted in heavy casualties as the numerically superior 
Federals overran the Confederate center.  The Union advance was only blunted when it 
reached the Confederate artillery on the other side of the woods, which forced a 
temporary Federal withdrawal.204  If Gordon had positioned his infantry alongside the 
artillery, they may have benefitted from the southern cannons and subsequently suffered 
fewer casualties, as it is doubtful the Federal assault would have been within rifle range 
of Gordon’s troops.  
The failed attempt to break the Confederate center spurred Sheridan to flank the 
southern line and he quickly dispatched VI and XIX Corps to assault opposing ends of 
Early’s position.  As the Union battle line separated into two isolated contingents, 
forming a gap, Early ordered a counterassault into the void.  Although this tactic may 
have worked in other circumstances, the Confederates suffered from heavy casualties and 
the counter attack quickly stalled.205  This attempt represented yet another costly tactical 
error by Early as the Confederates did not possess the numerical strength to take full 
advantage of such a maneuver and subsequently sustained heavy casualties.206  Early 
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alludes to his mistake of allowing his force to join the battle in piecemeal fashion in his 
memoirs when he remarks, “Had I then had a fresh body of troops to push our victory, 
the day would have been ours, but in this action, in the early part of the day, I had present 
only about 7,000 muskets, about 2,000 cavalry and two battalions of artillery with about 
30 guns; and they had all been engaged.”207  Gordon commented in his memoir, “This 
left practically only Rodes's division and mine, with parts of Ramseur's bleeding 
brigades, not more than 6000 men in all, to contend with Sheridan's whole army of about 
30,000 men, reaching in both directions far beyond our exposed right and left.”208  
Gordon’s comments indicate a tone of despair at the severe numerical discrepancies.  
Attrition among high-ranking Confederate officers also contributed to the general 
confusion and compromised the effectiveness of Early’s force.  Early went on to recount 
“But on our side, Major General Rodes had been killed, in the very moment of triumph, 
while conducting the attack of his division with great gallantry and skill, and this was a 
heavy blow to me. Brigadier General Godwin of Ramseur's division had been killed, and 
Brigadier General York of Gordon's division had lost an arm. Other brave men and 
officers had fallen, and we could illy bear the loss of any of them.”209 
Earlier in the day, the southern right had held against Federal assaults but 
Sheridan devised a plan to outflank the southern stronghold rendering the breastworks 
and emplacements useless.  Brigadier General James Wilson took a brigade of cavalry 
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around the far left of the Confederate position in an attempt to get behind Early’s line.210  
In this moment, the effects of casualties and numerical deficiencies manifested 
themselves and inhibited Confederate attempts to extend their line.  The southerners were 
unable to marshal enough troops to sufficiently lengthen their flanks and the Union 
cavalry forced a collapse of the entire Confederate position.   Lemuel Abijah Abbott of 
Sheridan’s army indicated in his account of the battle the numerical deficiencies of 
Early’s force.  He explained that despite the chaos and confusion of the fight he noticed 
that the Confederate battle line was very sparse.  He articulated how the Confederate line 
was visibly thin and could not hold out against a Federal assault.211  Early stated “The 
enemy's cavalry force, however, was too large for us, and having the advantage of open 
ground, it again succeeded in getting around our left, producing great confusion, for 
which there was no remedy. Nothing now was left for us but to retire through 
Winchester.”212     
Although Sheridan initiated the attack, Early had chosen the exact location of the 
battle as he deployed his troops along the heights to the east of Winchester.  Early’s 
selection of ground was problematic as it ultimately inhibited his path of retreat.  Early 
relied on a series of bottlenecks through which his army would need to pass if a 
withdrawal was necessary.  This mistake had costly consequences as the retreating 
Confederates funneled into the steep ravines between the battlefield and Winchester.  The 
Confederates were attempting to reach the Valley Pike, but the topography hampered 
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their egress and gave the pursuing Federals an opportunity to continue their assault.213  
This action inflicted further casualties on the battered Confederates as they attempted to 
flee the Union pursuers.  Here Early’s failure to adequately assess the ground and viable 
routes of escape directly affected rates of attrition.  Finally, elements of Early’s Corps 
reached the Valley Pike where they began their exodus south.  Although evening was 
beginning to set in, the pursuing Federals did not call off their pursuit and cavalry units 
continued to harass the retreating southern column.  The Confederates made little effort 
to screen their retreat, which made them vulnerable to sporadic fire as the Federals 
paralleled the Pike.214  Finally, the Confederates enjoyed a break in the action when night 
fell, making it increasingly difficult for the Federals to continue their harassing attacks.  
Gordon recounted Sheridan’s chase, “The pursuit was pressed far into the twilight, and 
only ended when night came and dropped her protecting curtains around us.”215 
The fighting concluded the night of September 19 and after hours of combat, the 
Confederates finally broke contact with the enemy.  In what would become known as the 
Third Battle of Winchester the Confederates mobilized approximately 11,500 troops and 
suffered nearly 3,800 casualties.  Sheridan’s force was substantially larger and consisted 
of over 42,000 men with no more than 5,000 dead, wounded, or missing.216  Given these 
statistics, the southerners suffered substantially higher casualty rates than their opponents, 
which would profoundly affect the remainder of the campaign.  However, Sheridan’s 
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force did suffer relatively high losses the majority of which came from the bloody frontal 
assaults on the Confederate left.  Despite these casualties this brazen and direct tactic 
achieved the intended result, but at a costly price.  Despite Federal losses Lincoln was 
well pleased with Sheridan’s results and in a dispatch to him stated, “Have just heard of 
your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and 
see you.”217 
In addition to casualties, the Confederates suffered from other forms of attrition as 
the shattered army was now disorganized and units were spread out along the Valley 
Pike.  This disorganization led to further confusion, which dramatically worsened the 
Confederate situation.  By September 21, the Confederate retreat was halted and Early 
found what he perceived to be a defensible position approximately one mile south of 
Strasburg, Virginia.  Early deployed his army into defensive positions and attempted to 
reorganize his depleted force.  The arduous march from Winchester severely dispersed 
his army at a time when he desperately needed every available man.  The tactical 
implications of a disorganized fighting force became increasingly evident as Early 
attempted to orchestrate a defense of Fisher’s Hill.218   
Sheridan’s victory did not preclude his force from suffering from disorganization 
and general attrition either.  Following the Third Battle of Winchester, the Federals were 
plagued with similar resource-draining operations such as tending to the injured and 
reorganizing after a large-scale battle.  Of the roughly 42,000 Federals that fought at 
                                                 
217
 Memoir of Phillip Henry Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P.H. Sheridan. General United States Army. 
vol 2. C.L. (Webster, New York, NY.), 268 
 
218
 Kim A. O’Connell “Fortifying Fisher’s Hill,” America’s Civil War 19, no. 1 (March 2006). 
 
  
83
Winchester, only about 30,000 made their way south to meet Early’s army.  The 
Confederates were in a much more precarious position as they were able to muster no 
more than 10,000 troops for their defense.  In many respects the action that was to take 
place near Fisher’s Hill was inextricably linked to the engagement at Winchester as 
casualties suffered there directly affected the following day’s tactics.219 
To adequately understand how casualties affected the Battle of Fisher’s Hill, it is 
imperative to grasp the topographical constraints of the region.  The Shenandoah Valley 
is bracketed by steep mountains on either side and these separate ranges taper 
progressively closer at the northernmost part of the region.  The Blue Ridge Mountains 
spanned the length of the Valley to the east and terminate at Strasburg.  To the west, the 
Allegheny Mountains define the Shenandoah and a series of knurled foothills around 
Fisher’s Hill flank the east side.  Massanutten Mountain, an offshoot of the Blue Ridge, 
runs down the center of the Valley, further constricting movement.  Here the Shenandoah 
Valley is no more than 3 miles wide and is wrought with dynamic topographical 
undulations, which made the maneuvering of troops quite complex.  In addition to the 
steep mountain ranges, the Shenandoah River also weaves through the Valley at this 
point, further inhibiting the placement of troops.220   
If travelling south along the Valley Pike, there are a series of protruding bluffs at 
Fisher’s Hill that would present an imposing obstacle if adequately manned.  These bluffs 
stretch from Massanutten Mountain west for approximately 2.5 miles and taper off just 
short of the Allegheny Mountain range.  Given the height and length of these bluffs, 
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Early perceived them to be an adequate defensive position and deployed his troops along 
the low ridge.  Early reasoned to Lee that Fisher’s Hill “was the only place where a stand 
could be made.”221 The Confederates were severely outnumbered, but sought to mitigate 
their numerical deficiencies with a strong defensive position.   
Early deployed Brigadier General Gabriel Wharton’s division on the Confederate 
right flank and anchored Wharton’s troops tightly up against the steep base of 
Massanutten Mountain.  This prevented a Federal flanking maneuver around the 
Confederate right, as the steep slope of the mountain did not lend itself to the movement 
of troops.  This was a sound tactical decision that drastically limited the avenues of attack 
on the Confederate position.  This preventative measure further limited the potential for 
southern casualties as it made a Federal assault from that direction almost impossible.222   
The Confederate center was occupied by Major General John Gordon’s division, 
which formed a small salient atop the bluffs.  Gordon’s center was a formidable 
emplacement as it sat atop the highest portion of bluffs and had a good field of fire as a 
long field sloped down toward the base of these hills.  This made the prospect of a frontal 
assault by Sheridan’s force quite daunting, as any attacking battle line would be exposed 
to heavy rifle and artillery fire.  To the west of Gordon’s position was Major General 
Stephen Dodson Ramseur’s division, which comprised the left flank of Early’s entire 
force.223  Ramseur’s unit was the weakest point of the Confederate defense for two 
primary reasons.  First, Ramseur’s portion of the line did not benefit from the landscape 
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as the bluffs flattened out into a low point in the center of Ramseur’s position.  This 
meant that the Confederates had no tactical benefits such as cover or hills to repulse a 
Federal assault there.  Second, the left flank was not anchored on any geographic 
strongpoint such as a mountain or a body of water.  Ramseur’s force was simply left 
floating a half-mile short of Little North Mountain, a segment of the Allegheny range.  
Early admitted to this tactical deficiency in his memoirs and explained that Ramseur’s 
portion of the defense “could not then be fully occupied.”224    
 Ramseur’s poor position was the manifestation of a tactical error due to 
numerical deficiencies caused by casualties and other forms of attrition from previous 
battles.  The Confederates were outnumbered nearly 3 to 1 and simply did not possess the 
manpower to span the critical half mile gap to the base of Little North Mountain.225  This 
left the entire line in a precarious position as a Federal flanking attempt around the 
Confederate left could succeed thus compromising the entire southern line.  Early 
committed a grave tactical error when he failed to recognize the profound implications of 
his numerical inferiority, and did not adjust his tactics to accommodate for his now 
smaller force.  It stands to reason that if Early had not accumulated such heavy casualties 
at Third Winchester, he may have had the troop strength to span the entire three miles, 
thus eliminating the probability of a successful Union flanking maneuver.226 
Sheridan quickly discerned the weakness in the Confederate position and 
capitalized on Early’s tactical error.  The Union commander ordered a frontal assault on 
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the Confederate center, which required the Federals to cross the deadly open field 
opposite of Gordon’s division.  This frontal assault was quite risky, as it may have 
resulted in heavy Federal casualties; however, Sheridan’s superior numbers gave him a 
degree of flexibility so that he was not limited to the use of conservative maneuvers.  
Furthermore, Sheridan’s frontal assault was designed to hold Early’s center in place and 
prevent the Confederates from realigning their troops to support their weak left flank.227  
Even Sheridan recognized that a frontal assault by itself would not expel the 
Confederates from their position as he states in his memoirs, “A reconnaissance made 
pending these movements convinced me that the enemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so 
strong that a direct assault would entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be 
of doubtful result.”228  However Sheridan did not rely solely on his frontal attack as this 
movement would be accompanied by the main thrust of the Federal attack, which 
consisted of an elaborate flanking maneuver designed to envelope the vulnerable 
Confederate left.  By late afternoon, Sheridan initiated his bold assault on Early’s 
beleaguered force.  At approximately 4:30 P.M. on September 22, Major General Horatio 
Wright’s VI Corps stepped off across the long sloping field to reach the Confederate 
center.  An eruption of heavy artillery and rifle fire ensued as the Confederates hoped to 
blunt the Federal charge.229  Simultaneously, Major General George Crook’s VIII Corps 
wheeled around the Confederate left and successfully reached the end of the southern 
line.  Either one of these Federal assaults may have individually been repulsed but in 
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conjunction with one another, they began to overwhelm the outnumbered southerners.230  
Fierce fighting ensued at the Confederate center and Gordon’s division began to give 
ground.  However, it was not until Crook’s Corps made contact with Ramseur’s division 
that the entire southern line began to collapse.231  Randolph Harrison Mckim, an enlisted 
soldier in the Confederate army, articulated in his memoir, the importance of Early’s 
numerical deficiencies at Fisher’s Hill.  He indicated that the sparsely manned 
Confederate position was readily shattered and pushed from their trenches.232  Higher 
level reports echo these sentiments.  Gordon commented somewhat sharply on the events: 
“Our stay was short, however, and our leaving was hurried, without ceremony or concert. 
It is the old story of failure to protect flanks.”233 
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Ramseur attempted to extend his line
prevent the Federals from out flanking his position.  Once the Federals reached the rear of 
Ramseur’s force, the entire Confederate army began to fall into confusion
frantically retreat once again down the Valley Pike.
mistake from Third Winchester when he failed to account for an easy route of escape.  At 
Fisher’s Hill, Early preserved his avenue of retreat and, despite the chaos of defeat, was 
able to funnel the majority of his troops
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Early saved many of his troops, he was unable to extricate much of his equipment and 
artillery, which Sheridan’s army captured.236 
Sheridan erred by initiating his attack so late in the day as the setting sun spelled 
the end of the battle and a lost opportunity to thoroughly destroy Early’s force.  Despite 
this error, Sheridan’s plan had worked masterfully and the Confederates suffered a 
second devastating defeat in four days.  Gordon summed up the day’s events quite 
succinctly when he stated in his memoirs, “The battle, or, to speak more accurately, the 
bout at Fisher's Hill, was so quickly ended that it may be described in a few words. 
Indeed, to all experienced soldiers, the whole story is told in one word—‘flanked.’"237  
Grant, in his memoirs, recognized the feasibility of Early’s defense at Fisher’s Hill states 
that Sheridan readily flanked the Confederates.  Grant indicates a sense of pride in his 
description of the battle when he comments, “The valley is narrow at that point, and 
Early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. But Sheridan 
turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot 
pursuit.”238  Of the 30,000 Federals engaged at Fisher’s Hill, they suffered insignificant 
casualties of less than 700.  The Confederates, however, experienced a much higher 
casualty rate of nearly 1,100.  This is over 10 percent of the troops Early had available at 
the onset of the battle.239  Fisher’s Hill stands as a powerful example of the relationship 
                                                 
236
 Gallagher, The Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Page 
 
237
 John B. Gordon. General Gordon’s Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1904), 326 
 
238
 Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant, Page 366 
 
239
 “Fisher’s Hill” CWSAC Battle Summaries: The American Battlefield Protection Program National Park 
Service, accessed January 3, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va120.htm 
 
  
90
between tactical errors and attrition.  It is also clear given the analysis that the 
combination of these two errors directly contributed to Confederate defeat.       
Early’s Confederates retreated up the Valley 75 miles towards Staunton and then 
headed east eventually stopping at Waynesboro, Virginia.  By retreating so far south, 
Early left the entire northern valley vacant and open to Sheridan’s triumphant army.  
Although Early had temporarily abandoned the northern portions of the Shenandoah 
Valley, it was a sound strategic decision as his force had been worn down over the 
preceding days and rendered relatively ineffective.  If Early had attempted to engage 
Sheridan again it could have been disastrous, as the Confederates had lost almost 8,000 
men in the previous seven days to various forms of attrition.  With these factors in mind, 
Early’s conservative approach was appropriate so as to avoid further losses.240  Given the 
relative security of Waynesboro it is apparent that Early may have been better off 
directing his army there directly following the defeat at Winchester thus avoiding the 
potential for a devastating defeat at Fisher’s Hill altogether.241     
The Confederate retreat was not without consequence as Sheridan’s army slowly 
followed the southerners eventually stopping on September 26 at Harrisonburg, Virginia.  
This repositioning marked the beginning of a new phase of Sheridan’s campaign.  The 
crop production of the Shenandoah Valley had always been recognized as an important 
strategic target for both sides during the conflict.242  Sheridan, in an effort to deprive the 
Confederates of these important natural resources, devised a plan to permanently cripple 
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the ability of the Shenandoah to supply the Confederate army.  Grant had always 
intended Sheridan’s force to perform such action as evidenced in his July 14, 1864 letter 
to headquarters in Washington that an army should be created to “to eat out Virginia clear 
and clean … so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry 
their provender with them.”243 For approximately two weeks, Sheridan dispatched 
cavalry units on a series of raids to raze and otherwise destroy the farmlands, mills, and 
barns in the southern portion of the Valley.  In this period, Federal cavalry systematically 
burned large swaths of farmland and anything that could be of use to the enemy.244  
The duration of Sheridan’s occupation in the southern Shenandoah Valley was 
short lived as he soon directed his army north on the Valley Pike towards Winchester, 
Virginia.  During Early’s stay in Waynesboro, his force received desperately needed 
reinforcements when Lee dispatched approximately three brigades to replenish some of 
the losses Early received during the earlier portion of his campaign.  Lee had reinforced 
Early’s force so that he could resume his efforts to fulfill Lee’s directive of disrupting 
Union operations along with protecting the resources in the Valley from Sheridan’s 
marauding force.  The Confederates slowly worked their way north cautiously following 
Sheridan’s army.  On October 9, Union Brigadier Generals Alfred Torbert and George 
Custer halted their retreat up the valley and attempted to slow the advance of Early’s 
pursuing force at Tom’s Brook.245  They clashed with Major General Thomas L. Rosser’s 
cavalry and the superior numbers of the Federals allowed them to quickly route the 
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southerners.  To Early’s credit he avoided making this action into a full scale clash as he 
desperately needed to preserve his fighting force for a more productive opportunity.  
Following this relatively small clash, the Confederates resumed their pursuit of 
Sheridan’s army and by October 12 reached their old positions around Fisher’s Hill.246  
Although Fisher’s Hill was not a wise position to hold during the engagement there 
weeks before, Early now possessed the troop strength to span the full 3 miles between 
Massanutten Mountain and the Allegheny Mountains.  This was a sound decision as he 
could sufficiently anchor his line at the base of each mountain, thus eliminating the 
probability of a flanking attack.247  Gordon, in his memoirs, referred to the position as 
“unassailable” and that it could not be flanked as it was a month earlier.  It should be 
noted that occupying this position was only possible with sufficient numbers as Early 
now had approximately 20,000 men at his disposal.248 
Aside from the action at Tom’s Brook, Sheridan had little indication that the 
Confederates were capable of mustering the necessary troops to strike at his larger army.  
Following the extensive fighting in the previous month and the stunning victories at 
Winchester and Fisher’s Hill, it is likely that Sheridan assumed Early’s army had been 
neutralized, at least for the time being.  Sheridan certainly suggested as much as he 
ordered Major General Horatio G. Wright’s VI Corps back to the siege at Petersburg.  
This realignment of troops would have further balanced the numerical scales by draining 
Sheridan’s troop strength.  However, the VI Corps’ return to Petersburg was halted when 
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Early moved his army north from Fisher’s Hill.249  The Confederates marched three miles 
north to the heights around Strasburg and rapidly moved their artillery into position atop 
Hupp’s Hill.  From here they began to shell the Union encampment around Cedar Creek 
and Belle Grove, a prominent plantation.250  Early did a superb job of discretely moving 
his army to the heights without alerting the Federals of his presence.  This sound tactical 
maneuver gave the southerners an opportunity to strike the Federals and inflict casualties 
while not placing their own troops at significant risk.251  However, this initial success was 
double edged as it alerted the Federals of the Confederates presence, which spurred 
Sheridan to recall Wright’s Corps to reinforce the Union position.  It is not clear why 
Early decided to assault the Federals here, as he knew Sheridan had intended to send a 
portion of his force back to Grant.  In his memoirs, Early admits to knowing of 
Sheridan’s decision to send a portion of his force back to Grant, but opts to assault the 
Federal position anyway.252   
  Colonel Joseph Thoburn’s division formed up and assaulted the Confederate 
artillery atop Hupp’s Hill and a fierce but abbreviated fight ensued.  Neither side suffered 
significant casualties, and the action was relatively inconclusive as night fell, ending the 
day’s action.  Early’s decision to attack before Wright’s Corps had left the vicinity was 
most definitely a mistake.  If Early had paused to gain more intelligence as to the 
Federals’ precise movements, he would have realized that Wright’s departure would 
dramatically benefit his prospects in the Valley.  Early was operating in a region that had 
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many Confederate sympathizers, which he certainly should have drawn upon to obtain 
better intelligence.253   
Despite the presence of Early’s army on October 16, Sheridan departed for 
Washington leaving his force camped just south of Middletown, Virginia.  Early, 
unaware of Sheridan’s departure, engaged in a series of counterintelligence operations 
with the intent of confusing the Federals.  Early hoped that a show of overwhelming force 
would prompt Sheridan to move his army north or out of the Valley completely.  The 
Confederates intentionally provided the Federals with misinformation when they 
conspicuously signaled, by semaphore, that Early was expecting James Longstreet’s 
Corps to reinforce him in the Shenandoah Valley.254  When news of this reached 
Sheridan, he cancelled his journey to Washington and returned to his troops255  Grant, in 
his memoirs, commented on Early’s blunder stating, “The next morning while at Front 
Royal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatch from Longstreet 
to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush 
Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered 
the cavalry up the valley to join Wright.”256  Here again Early’s endeavors backfired as 
his attempt to intimidate the Federals with the prospect of Confederate reinforcements 
merely solidified Sheridan’s resolve to remain in the Shenandoah.  Given the tenacity and 
effort that Sheridan had exhibited in the Valley, it is curious that Early would expect a 
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tactic of this nature to scare Sheridan into leaving.  Previous attempts by Early to make 
his force appear larger than it actually was resulted in reinforcements being rushed to Fort 
Stevens and ultimately Sheridan’s arrival in the Valley with 50,000 men.  This past 
evidence should have suggested to Early that his tactic would not achieve the desired 
effect but rather the opposite.  Previously, any show of Confederate force was swiftly 
answered with Union reinforcements and a concerted effort to neutralize Early’s threat.  
Early’s endeavor to trick his enemy proved to be yet another mistake that would have 
profound consequences over the next few days.257   
Although the Federals were now aware of Early’s presence, the Confederate 
commander hatched a daring plan to surprise the encampments around Cedar Creek.  The 
Federals had, in their estimation, made good use of the local topography when they 
organized their camps around the open fields directly south of Middletown.  To the 
Union right, a series of steep undulating slopes followed Cedar Creek northwest, which 
made a southern attack from that direction impossible.258  The Shenandoah River, which 
meandered along a series of steep banks, flanked the Federal left making a Confederate 
incursion from that side quite unlikely.259   
The Union position, however, was not entirely impenetrable, as a little known 
route around the Federal’s left flank did in fact exist.260  With the help of some locals and 
chief cartographer Jedediah Hotchkiss, Early was made aware of two shallow fords 
                                                 
257
 Hamlin, The Battle of Cedar Creek and the Recaptured Guns, Page 23 
 
258
 Report of Torbert, War of the Rebellion, Series I. Volume. 43. Part 1, Page 421-425 
 
259
 Whitehorne, The Battle of Cedar Creek, Page 107 
 
260
 “Cedar Creek,” CWSAC Battle Summaries: The American Battlefield Protection Program National Park 
Service, accessed January 5, 2015, http://www.nps.gov/abpp/battles/va122.htm 
 
  
96
approximately one mile east of Strasburg along the North Fork of the Shenandoah.  Early 
sought to utilize the fords by covertly moving a segment of his army across the 
Shenandoah River to strike at the unsuspecting northerners on the other side.  Gordon 
commented on the daring maneuver in his memoirs stating, “It was unmistakably evident 
that General Sheridan concurred in the universally accepted opinion that it was 
impracticable for the Confederates to pass or march along the rugged and almost 
perpendicular face of Massanutten Mountain and assail his left.”261  On the night of 
October 18, Major General John B. Gordon’s division set out to utilize the fords along 
the Union left and by the morning of October 19 was in position to strike.  In addition to 
Gordon’s elaborate flanking attempt, Early dispatched Major General Kershaw’s division 
to cross Cedar Creek and strike Brigadier General George Crook’s Army of West 
Virginia.262  Directly to the west of Kershaw’s attack Brigadier General Wharton was 
instructed to move up the Valley Pike and engage the Union right.  This formed a three 
pronged attack that was designed to both surprise and envelope the Union camps.263 
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Although Early’s plan of attack was tactically sound, he had already made his first 
major mistake by failing to recognize a basic need present amongst his troops.  The 
condition of Early’s Confederates had become increasingly poor as they lacked many 
basic necessities such as shoes, adequate clothing, and various foodstuffs.
depended on his troops surprising the Federals in their camps and pushing them from 
their position.  This tactic would place the Confederate troops in close proximity to many 
of the goods they desperately needed and would be a tempting opportunity for them to 
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slow or even halt their advance.  Despite these circumstances, there is no evidence that 
Early emphasized the importance of keeping his ranks together to his lieutenants and 
various subordinates.  This mistake would have reverberating effects throughout the rest 
of the day.266   
At 5 A.M. Early initiated his three-pronged attack with Gordon’s division 
slamming into the unsuspecting camps of Crook’s Army of West Virginia.  The presence 
of Gordon’s troops on their side of the Shenandoah River shocked the Federals.  Crook’s 
troops immediately gave way to the charging southern line, which spurred Brigadier 
General William Emory to reposition his XIX Corps to blunt Gordon’s assault.267  Early 
remarked, “Gordon, however, pushed his attack with great energy, and the 19th and 
Crook's corps were in complete rout, and their camps, with a number of pieces of artillery 
and a considerable quantity of small arms, abandoned.”268  This realignment opened the 
path for Gabriel Wharton’s division to march unimpeded up the Valley Pike and strike at 
the fleeing Federals.  By 6 A.M., the entire Union line was in disarray and collapsing as 
the Confederate pincer movement worked entirely as planned.269  Even Grant admits to 
the effectiveness of the Confederate attack when he said “On the 18th of October Early 
was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our 
left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing 
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eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners.”270  Sheridan also 
articulates the ferocity of the Confederate assault when he stated, “Kershaw opening the 
fight by a furious attack on Thoburn's division, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon 
struck Crook's extreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp with such 
suddenness as to stampede Crook's men.”271  
The Federals were in full retreat and giving up ground at an alarming rate as the 
Confederate onslaught pushed Sheridan’s battered force toward Middletown.  However, 
initial Confederate success was soon eclipsed by the Confederate commander’s inability 
to keep his force concentrated and on the attack.  Early’s failure to prepare for his troops 
looting the Federal camps resulted in a dilution of his divisions as they made their way 
through the Union position, ripe with a bounty of clothing and food.272  Early recounted, 
“As I passed across Cedar Creek after the enemy was driven from it, I had discovered a 
number of men in the enemy's camps plundering, and one of Wharton's battalions was 
ordered to clear the camps, and drive the men to their commands.”  He went on to say, “It 
was reported to me, subsequently, that a great number were at the same work, and I sent 
all my staff officers who could be spared, to stop it if possible, and orders were sent to the 
division commanders to send for their men.”273  This clearly evidences that the 
Confederates lost exponentially more troops as units were dispatched to retrieve those 
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that had been broken ranks.  Ultimately, the responsibility to manage the troops fell to the 
commanding general and a strong argument can be made that Early failed by not 
asserting the necessary control functions to manage his army.274     
In addition to this grave tactical error, the attrition from the previous month’s 
combat began to manifest itself as Confederate numerical deficiencies inhibited Early’s 
ability to maintain his assault.  The troops lost in the fighting from the previous two 
months were sorely missed as the Confederate columns began to thin out over the mile 
and a half since the attack began.275  The Federals continued to flee, but the effective 
number of troops Early had on the front lines exponentially diminished as he pursued the 
withdrawing northerners.  Here the correlation between tactics and attrition became 
evident, as Early perceived that he did not possess the necessary manpower to continue 
his attack.276 
By noon Early had reached the north end of town where he would make his next 
and most critical mistake.  Early feared his army had become overextended and ordered a 
halt to his attack.  In his memoirs, Early blamed attrition: “It was now apparent that it 
would not do to press my troops further. They had been up all night and were much 
jaded. In passing over rough ground to attack the enemy in the early morning, their own 
ranks had become disordered, the men scattered, and it had required time to re-form 
them. Their ranks, moreover, were much thinned by the advance of the men engaged in 
plundering the enemy's camps.”277  Gordon commented on Early’s halt saying, “We 
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halted, we hesitated, we dallied, firing a few shots here, attacking with a brigade or a 
division there, and before such feeble assaults the superb Union corps retired at 
intervals.278”  This fatal error gave the Federals an invaluable opportunity to salvage what 
had been a disastrous day.  Prior to the battle, Sheridan had been approximately twenty 
miles away in Winchester, Virginia.  Upon hearing of the Confederate surprise attack, he 
mounted his horse and raced toward Cedar Creek.  He arrived to see his army disoriented 
and fleeing the field.  Although the Federals were in full retreat, Early’s army had halted 
their pursuit giving Sheridan the necessary time to rally his shattered troops and organize 
a counter attack.279  Sheridan’s presence on the battlefield had a resounding effect on his 
men and by 4:00 P.M., they began to push Early’s diluted force south.  Early had lost the 
momentum and Sheridan capitalized on the results of Confederate attrition and tactical 
mistakes by ordering a full-scale frontal assault on Early’s force.280  
The Confederates, lacking the necessary concentration of troops to repulse the 
attack, began to crumble under Sheridan’s assault and soon fell into a scattered retreat 
back down the Valley Pike.  The southerners fled to their old positions around Fisher’s 
Hill and awaited a continuation of the Federal counterattack.  Despite this expectation, 
Sheridan halted his advance at Cedar Creek allowing Early to disengage and regroup 
what was left of his shattered force.  The following day the Confederates fled south 
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toward New Market, and within the next week returned to Waynesboro.281   
Following the devastating defeat at Cedar Creek, the majority of Early’s troops 
returned to Petersburg to support Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.  The Confederate 
defeat at Cedar Creek marked the end of Early’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley as 
his force had been demolished and Union dominance firmly established in the region.282  
The defeat at Cedar Creek was the culmination of gradually accumulating attrition and 
faulty tactics that eventually caught up with Early’s force.  Of the some 20,000 
Confederates present at the battle, they suffered 3,000 casualties.  The numerical value of 
these Confederate losses is somewhat deceiving, as Early’s army had experienced a 
defeat that severely scattered his force. The southern route dispersed the Confederate 
army to the extent that Early was unable to reorganize what was left his force into a 
cohesive fighting unit.  In this sense the casualties represented the complete destruction 
of the Confederate army in the Shenandoah.  The Union, on the other hand, fielded over 
31,000 troops and suffered no less than 5,500 killed, wounded and missing.  Despite 
Sheridan’s seemingly heavy losses, he managed to effectively marshal his resources so as 
to ensure the permanent destruction of Early’s army.283 
Lee ordered what remained of Early’s army to return to Petersburg leaving the 
Shenandoah open to the Federals.  For the remainder of October and throughout the 
winter of 1864, Sheridan’s army operated with impunity throughout the region destroying 
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whatever they deemed necessary.  Even with the return of the troops Lee had sent to the 
Shenandoah Valley, he was ultimately unable to protect Petersburg and Richmond.  By 
April 1865, Lee capitulated and formally surrendered his army to Ulysses S. Grant, thus 
concluding major military action in the region.  Despite initial success in the Shenandoah 
Valley, Early ultimately failed in his attempt to disrupt Union operations and 
permanently tie up the Federal’s resources there.  He was also unsuccessful in his bid to 
protect the resources of the Shenandoah and, following his retreat south, the region 
remained under Union control for the remainder of the war.   
Sheridan’s 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley started off slow yielding 
little progress against Early’s army.  Clashes such as the Battle of Berryville left both 
Union and Confederate commanders unsatisfied as they both sought a decisive battle with 
definitive results.  Early’s raid north gave Sheridan the opportunity he needed to strike 
the Confederate force and gain a decisive victory.  Early attempted to defend his 
columns, but was eventually overrun and routed.  The Confederate retreat was halted 
when Early selected a few bluffs at Fisher’s Hill as his best opportunity to turn and fight 
the Federal pursuers.  Despite Early’s attempt to defend this position Confederate losses 
from previous days and tactical mistakes resulted in yet another Confederate defeat.   
Following the stunning Federal victory at Fisher’s Hill, Early retreated south to 
Waynesboro where he sought to reorganize his defeated army.  After a few weeks in the 
southern Shenandoah Valley, the Confederates once again moved north to engage and 
defeat Sheridan’s numerically superior force.  Early maneuvered his army to Strasburg, 
Virginia where he staged a daring surprise attack on the Federal army encamped near 
Cedar Creek.  The Confederate surprise attack started off quite well and shocked the 
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Federals but tactical errors and attrition began to inhibit the southern advance.  
Eventually the Confederate advance stalled and Sheridan was able to mount a successful 
counter attack, which shattered Early’s army.  Following the action at Cedar Creek, 
Early’s army in the Shenandoah Valley ceased to exist, thus concluding the Sheridan’s 
1864 Valley Campaign.  Following Early’s absolute failure in the Shenandoah Valley 
Lee was forced to relieve Early of his command as both the military and civilian 
population had lost faith in his ability to command an independent army.  The ever tactful 
Lee wrote to Early “While my own confidence in your ability, zeal, and devotion to the 
cause is unimpaired, I have nevertheless felt that I could not oppose what seems to be the 
current of opinion, without injustice to your reputation and injury to the service. I 
therefore felt constrained to endeavor to find a commander who would be more likely to 
develop the strength and resources of the country, and inspire the soldiers with 
confidence.”284  This marked the end of Early’s military career and the beginning of his 
role as an iconic unreconstructed analyst of the war and other’s mistakes.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Shenandoah Valley was the backdrop for a tremendous military action 
throughout the course of the war.  The region saw elaborate military campaigns along 
with a multitude of smaller clashes and partisan activity.  Starting as early as 1862 the 
Valley was the site of full scale military operations where figures like Thomas 
“Stonewall” Jackson gained worldwide recognition for their exploits and tactical acumen.  
Both the Union and the Confederacy quickly recognized that the Valley represented an 
important military objective and devoted significant resources to the region for the 
remainder of the war.   
By mid-1864 Ulysses S. Grant held supreme control of the Union military and 
rapidly implemented a grand strategy that would devote specific attention to the 
Shenandoah Valley.  The region had been used to orchestrate Confederate forays into the 
North along with being a source of food production for Lee’s army defending Richmond.  
Additionally, the Shenandoah provided an excellent avenue of advance toward the vitally 
important railroad hubs around Lynchburg, which were essential to the Confederate 
defense of Richmond These factors, made the region an even greater military target for 
the Union.  Furthermore, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia quickly found 
themselves in an increasingly desperate siege around Richmond and Lee sought to dilute 
Grant’s besieging force by opening a new front in the Shenandoah, thus necessitating a 
realignment of Federal armies.  
The first 1864 campaign in the Valley went relatively well for the Confederates as 
they won a stunning victory at New Market by marshaling all available resources and 
limiting casualties.  Furthermore, they employed sound tactics which resulted in an 
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embarrassing Union defeat.  The subsequent battles at Piedmont and Lynchburg further 
accentuated the distinct correlation between attrition and tactics as is evidenced by their 
outcomes.  Early’s campaign in the northern portion of the Shenandoah and his victory at 
Monocacy stand as excellent examples of how tactics can be utilized to prevent 
casualties.  Additionally, they expose how low attrition paired with sound battlefield 
judgment is a winning combination.  The action at Washington D.C. and the following 
Confederate withdrawal are all excellent examples of what can be accomplished when 
tactics are focused to prevent attrition.  Sheridan’s Valley Campaign further demonstrates 
the relationship between battlefield decisions and attrition as he mobilized his force to 
shatter Early’s army at Winchester and then exploited Confederate attrition for a second 
victory at Fisher’s Hill.  The culminating battle in the Shenandoah Valley at Cedar Creek 
is an excellent example of the profound relationship between attrition and tactics as it is 
clear that initial Confederate success was due to the relatively low losses they suffered.  
Furthermore, the following fatal halt and eventual Confederate route was a direct result of 
poor tactics paired with heavy losses.    
Given the evidence provided within this research, there most certainly exists an 
inextricable correlation between tactics and attrition.  It is also clear that attrition affected 
the 1864 Valley Campaigns as casualties and troops unavailable for combat dramatically 
altered the tactics utilized.  The relationship between these two factors consistently 
effected results on the battlefield and the eventual fate of the Valley.  The outcome of 
such a sweeping campaign cannot be linked exclusively to these two factors; however, 
they do contribute to the overall understanding of the conflict.   
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It is the hope of this research to redirect the analysis of these Valley Campaigns to 
incorporate a serious appraisal of tactics and attrition.  Any understanding of the outcome 
of these campaigns cannot be derived without a firm grasp of the relationship between 
these two factors.  In many regards, attrition and casualties dominated the decisions of 
both sides and it is clear that whoever could best manage these variables drastically 
increased their chances of success.  However, by the summer of 1865, the war was over 
and the inhabitants of the Shenandoah Valley enjoyed a return to normalcy.  The damage 
from Sheridan’s raids and the bloody battles of the previous years gradually healed and 
gave way to a new chapter in American history.  The hallowed ground that was the site of 
so much bloodshed returned to farmland, and there was once again peace in the Valley.   
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